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1. Introduction 
Structural reforms of the municipal sector are common phenomena in most European 
countries, and they end mostly up with the creation of larger political units. The 
amalgamation of smaller municipalities is usually justified by functional arguments, 
such as the effective production of municipal services, while democratic aspects often 
are neglected. This is partly because the political decision-takers give priority to 
economic arguments, but also because the knowledge about the relationship between 
size and democracy is rather limited. Therefore, the research project “Size and local 
democracy in Norway”, which this thesis is a part of, tries to gather more knowledge 
about the relationship between size and democracy. 
The basic question with regard to this issue is whether the size of a political unit 
influences the quality of a democratic system. Is there an ideal size for political units 
that ensure the best conditions for democracy? An answer to this question is certainly 
dependent on which conception of democracy we apply. Democracy, which generally 
means government by the people, can be defined in a number of ways (Myrvold 
2001). The two most important forms of democracy are direct democracy and 
representative democracy. Direct democracy implies that the people can participate 
directly in the process of government, for instance by a referendum or by contacting a 
politician personally. The motivation behind the participation in forms of direct 
democracy is generally the wish to affect the outcome of decisions around particular 
political issues, which are personally important for the participant. When we talk of 
representative democracy, we refer to a system where people delegate their power to 
a representative by means of popular elections. Here, the outcome on a particular 
issue is not the primary motivation for participation; the participant engages in 
politics to affect political decisions that are important for the whole community. 
With regard to the size of a political unit, it is a popular assumption that direct 
forms of democracy work best in smaller and less complex political units, where it is 
easier for the residents to have knowledge about political issues and the political 
actors. A representative system, on the other hand, is often thought of as related to 
larger political units. The larger a political unit, the larger is the distance between 
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citizen and government, and the stronger is the need for citizens to delegate power to 
the politicians. 
In reality, we do not find political systems that are characterized by only one form 
of democracy. In Norwegian municipalities, the residents elect the representatives in 
the municipal council, but we find also elements of direct democracy: citizens may 
contact politicians or participate in political actions. When we accept the statement 
that the level of participation in general should be as high as possible, then the ideal 
size of a municipality is that size which corresponds with a maximum likelihood of 
participation, both directly and via the representative system. Nevertheless, it is 
reasonable to assume that we will not manage to identify an ideal size of a political 
unit; some forms of participation are maximized in larger political units, while other 
forms of participation are maximized in smaller units. 
The basic question is therefore if there is a relationship between municipality size 
and participation in Norwegian municipalities at all. If this is the case, it is important 
to know more about this relationship. Is it strong or weak, positive or negative? And 
what is the mechanism that ties the size of a municipality together with the level of 
participation? These questions are, of course, very general and therefore not suited for 
empirical testing; they have to be specified further. Later in this chapter, we present 
the most important concepts of this work and specify the research questions further. 
However, before that, we demonstrate that an analysis of the relationship between 
size and participation is meaningful. 
1.1 The relevance of size and participation 
One can argue that the quality of a democratic system is not solely characterized by 
the act of political participation; other aspects might be interesting as well. However, 
there are arguments that imply a more detailed analysis of the relationship between 
size and participation. In this section, we present some of these arguments. 
Furthermore, we will also demonstrate that the public debate with regard to changes 
of the municipal structure in Norway not only emphasize functional aspects, but 
democratic aspects as well. Finally, we consider a selection of scientific works that 
focus on the relationship between size and democracy. These works show that the 
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issue of size and participation has already been discussed scientifically for a while. In 
sum, all these aspects - theoretical arguments, public debate, and empirical analyses – 
demonstrate the importance of an investigation of the relationship between size and 
democracy. 
1.1.1 Theoretical arguments 
The first argument that justifies an investigation of the relationship between size and 
participation can be summarized under the label “school of democracy” (Hansen et 
al. 2002; Vetter 2002). According to this line of thinking, local democracy is 
supposed to be less complex and easier to access for ordinary people. Because of 
these characteristics, local self-government supports a number of objectives that are 
in favour of democracy in general. In the first place, local democracy serves as a 
socializing institution; it is the base of recruitment for national politicians and teaches 
democratic values to the ordinary citizens. And secondly, local self-government gives 
important legitimizing support for the political system as a whole in an era of an 
increased alienation of the citizens from national and international politics (Vetter 
2002: 3ff). This line of reasoning implies that participation has a value of its own. 
Because of this, it is important to investigate which characteristics of a municipality 
affect the individual participation in the local political system, in order to create an 
environment that supports citizen involvement and makes local self-government a 
real “school of democracy”. Municipality size is certainly of relevance in this context. 
Another argument for analyzing the relationship between the number of residents 
in a municipality and political participation emphasizes the instrumental function of 
political participation. Political participation is, in this view, seen as an instrument 
that communicates the preferences of the population to the political decision-takers. 
According to this view of participation, it is important that all residents have equal 
access to the political area. However, one can assume that political participation, in 
general, is easier in smaller municipalities because the political system is less 
complex. This means that the participants need more social resources (such as 
education or income) to participate in the politics of larger municipalities than are 
required in the smaller municipalities. According to this reasoning, will residents that 
have a high amount of social resources available have easier access to the political 
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arena in larger municipalities than persons that have only a limited amount of 
resources. Consequently, the process of amalgamating smaller municipalities into 
larger units will result in a situation where the amount of resources determines whose 
voice is heard, and whose is ignored. Therefore, it is important to investigate the 
relationship between size and participation further and to uncover the connection 
between the distribution of individual resources, the likelihood of political 
participation, and municipality size. 
1.1.2 Public debate in Norway 
In Norway, as in other Western countries, structural changes of the municipalities 
have been in the focus of the public debate a number of times in the past decades 
(NOU 1974, 1986, 1989). Recently, the so-called Christiansen-committee analyzed 
the municipality (and county) structure around 1990 (NOU 1992). In this evaluation, 
the focus was not entirely on functional aspects of the municipal (and county) 
structure. Among other criteria, the relationship between municipality size and local 
democracy is explicitly mentioned as important in this context: 
“The superior objective of a reform of the municipal- and county-
division should be to create a structure that allows real local self-
government within the framework of the national community by: 
- a service production which is effective and which produces services 
that are practically available for the users, 
- a development of society that gives rise to good patterns of 
development and that results in municipalities and counties that are 
capable of further development, and 
- a living local democracy, which increases the possibility of the 
municipalities and counties to influence their own environment.” 
(NOU 1992: 43; translated from Norwegian by the author) 
With regard to the analysis of the consequences of reforms of the municipal division 
on a “living local democracy”, three factors are identified as being of special interest: 
political participation, individual attachment to the local municipality, and the ability 
of the municipality to influence its environment. 
1.1.3 Previous research 
The scientific interest in the issue of size and democracy is not a novelty. Already in 
1967 Robert A. Dahl took up this issue in his presidential address at the Annual 
 5 
Meeting of the American Political Science Association in 1967 (see Dahl 1967). 
Some years later, in 1973, he published, together with Edward R. Tufte, the book 
“Size and Democracy”, which is the first systematically and profoundly approach to 
the issue. They created a theoretical framework and formulated a number of 
hypotheses regarding the relationship between size and democracy. Unfortunately, 
their theoretical assumptions were not tested empirically to a larger degree. This was 
due to the fact that “limitations of data are often overwhelming” (Dahl & Tufte 1973: 
28). However, their book constitutes a very inspiring collection of hypotheses 
concerning size and democracy and can be regarded as a major source of inspiration 
for this work. The most important arguments from this book will be presented in 
more detail in Chapter 3. 
In the course of the years a number of empirical studies were published that tried 
to test some hypotheses regarding size and democracy. Already before the major 
work of Dahl & Tufte was published, Verba & Nie (1972) attempted to test the 
empirical validity of two competing models regarding size and participation in the 
American context. They categorized American municipalities into a number of 
community types, with regard to their size and its distance to a metropolitan centre 
(their degree of isolation). The “Mobilization Model” predicts a higher level of 
political participation in larger and more central municipalities. On the contrary, the 
“Decline-of-Community Model” predicts a “decline of participation as one moves 
from the smallness and intimacy or town or village to the massive impersonality of 
the city” (Verba & Nie 1972: 231). They concluded with the following: “There are 
some ambiguities, yet the overall pattern lends support to the decline-in-community 
model. Participation does indeed decline as communities grow, […]” (ibid: 242). But 
two limitations concerning this conclusion has to be pointed out: first, the relationship 
between community type and participation is not uniform for all modes of 
participation, and second, the degree of isolation seems to have an more important 
impact on the likelihood of participation than the size of a municipality. 
In another, more recent, analysis of the relationship between size and participation 
in American municipalities, Oliver (2000) finds that the level of participation in 
general declines with increasing municipality size in metropolitan areas. This is true 
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for contacting local officials, attending organizational meetings or community board 
meetings, but only to a limited degree for voting in local elections. With regard to 
participation in elections, the general tendency is also a decline in participation with 
increased municipality size. However, in this case, there seems to be a slightly 
increase in the average participation in municipalities of medium size. The negative 
relationship between size and participation remains constant also after controlling for 
“other individual and city-level characteristics” (Oliver 2000: 366).  
Bjørklund & Sørensen (1990) analyzed the relationship between size and political 
participation in Norway1. They found that this relationship is ambiguous with regard 
to different forms of participation. In smaller municipalities, the likelihood of 
participation in local elections is slightly higher than in larger municipalities. In 
addition, are residents in smaller municipalities more likely to contact locally elected 
representatives and to be a member of a party organization. On the other hand, the 
average participation in political actions, like signing a petition or demonstrating, is 
higher in larger municipalities. 
Rose (2002a) has carried out another empirical work on this subject. He analyzed 
the relationship between size and participation in three countries, but we will only 
present the results concerning Norway here. The bivariate relationship between size 
and five forms of participation is negative; therefore, it is generally less likely that the 
residents in larger municipalities participate in politics. However, the relationships 
are of different magnitudes: the association is strongest for contacting an elected 
representative and for attending a meeting regarding a local issue. It is also 
considerable for contacting a municipal civil servant, and lower, but still significant 
for participation in activities of an action group. With regard to the activity of signing 
a petition regarding a local issue, the association is no longer significant, indicating 
that there is no difference in the likelihood of participating in this form between 
municipalities of variable size. These effects of size on the likelihood of various 
forms of participation do not change significantly when controlling for a number of 
                                            
1
 The results of their analysis is included into the Christiansen committee rapport (NOU 1992), mentioned earlier 
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individual variables. It is important to note that Rose did not investigate the 
relationship between size and the level of participation in local elections. 
To sum up the previous research around the subject of size and participation, we 
get the impression that the likelihood of individual political participation tends to 
decrease when we move from smaller municipalities to larger ones. The only 
exceptions from this general rule are the participation in political actions and the 
participation in local elections, where the picture is inconclusive.  
1.2 Research problem and central concepts 
The previous section has given us enough reasons to investigate the relationship 
between municipality size and political participation further. Therefore, we will 
continue this work with a presentation of the most important concepts that will be 
used throughout this analysis. At the end of this section, we will be able to specify the 
research questions further. 
1.2.1 The dimensions of size 
Size is an ambiguous measure, and the size of a municipality can be measured on 
several dimensions (Dahl & Tufte 1973: 17ff). Certainly, the two most obvious 
measures are the area of a municipality and the number of residents within this area. 
Another possibility is to combine these two measures, in order to calculate, for 
instance, a municipality’s population density. 
In Norway, it is problematic to compare municipalities according to their 
geographic area. Norway is topographically scattered and characterized by valleys, 
rocks, and a long coastline. Consequently, not the whole area of a municipality is 
suitable for settlement. Therefore, when using area as a measure of size, one has to 
decide whether to use the total area of a municipality or only the area suitable for 
settlements. In addition, when choosing the area that is suitable for settlements as a 
measure, it might be relevant to get some indication about the distribution of this area 
within the boundaries of the municipalities. Is it connected and large, or scattered in 
many small pieces? The same problems arise when population density is used. In this 
case, we have to decide if we are interested in the population density within the whole 
area of a municipality or only within the areas that are suitable for settlements; and 
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this might result in large differences. A good theoretical measurement of density, 
which combines geographic size, the distribution of the population within the 
municipality, and population size, would probably be the average distance between 
the private homes in a municipality – though it will not be so easy to establish that 
measure in reality. 
Alternatively, one might also be interested in measures that function as substitute 
measures of size, like the economic structure, the character of social networks and the 
like (Rose 2002a: 3). Some of these measures are indeed relevant in the context of 
this work; although they are not regarded as measures of size but rather as covariates 
of municipality size, that have an impact on participation. This will be discussed in 
the next chapter. 
Irrespective of the difficulties mentioned above, it is clear that the research 
problem must be decisive for which conceptualization of size a researcher applies in 
his work. Is a researcher, for instance, interested in the effect of municipality size on 
the interaction patterns between the residents, or the characteristic of social networks, 
a definition of size as population density is reasonable. Within the theoretical 
framework of this work, however, the number of residents is most relevant. The 
reasons for this will become clearer in the course of this work. Therefore, we define 
size as the number of registered residents within a municipality (per 01.01.2001)2. 
1.2.2 The cleavage structure in a municipality 
In this work, we consider a municipality as being composed of various groups. A key 
assumption is in this respect that these groups have different interests on certain 
issues, and that they try to influence the outcome of local political processes in their 
favour. This conception of municipalities is nearly related to the work of political 
sociologist and their analysis of cleavages on the national level. Rae & Taylor (1970) 
define cleavages in this way: 
“Cleavages are the criteria which divide the members of a community 
or subcommunity into groups, and the relevant cleavages are those 
which divide members into groups with important political differences 
                                            
2
 In the remainder of this work, the term size refers always to the number of residents, if nothing else is mentioned 
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at specific times and places.” (Rae & Taylor 1970: 1; cited in Lane & 
Ersson 1999: 41) 
It is important to notice that a cleavage not necessarily will lead to conflict, and that a 
cleavage therefore not has to be visible in the political system. According to Lane & 
Ersson can a cleavage 
“…lead to conflict, but a cleavage need not always be attended by 
conflict. A division of individuals, groups or organizations constitutes a 
cleavage if there is some probability of conflict.” (Lane & Ersson 1999: 
41) 
Therefore, cleavages can be differentiated into latent and manifest cleavages. A latent 
cleavage is a separation of the population which has the potential of a political 
conflict, but which is not realized and therefore has no consequence on the political 
arena. A manifest cleavage, however, is a separation of the population into groups 
that actually results in a conflict around political decisions. When there is a manifest 
cleavage, it is likely that the different groups along this cleavage are supporting 
different parties and that the cleavage therefore is transformed into the party system. 
A problem in this context is it to differentiate between a cleavage that is latent and a 
cleavage that is not existent, this means to decide whether a division of individuals 
that is not visible in the party system has some potential of conflict or not. Therefore, 
it is important that the classification of the population into groups along cleavages 
makes sense theoretically. Lane & Ersson maintain in this context: 
“The identification of the cleavages to be studied depends upon theory 
or theoretical assumption. […] The choice of cleavages to be included 
in the analysis may be justified not on the basis of a typology or on the 
basis of an enumeration of types of cleavages found, but on the basis of 
theoretical arguments about interrelationships between cleavages and 
the other properties to be studied.” (Lane & Ersson 1999: 43-4) 
Consequently, it is important to have a theoretical basis for the classification of the 
population into groups along a number of cleavages. In this work, this theoretical 
basis is the residents’ self-interest in the production of a particular set of public 
services by their home municipalities. Of course, this theoretical basis for the 
cleavage structure within a municipality is controversial, and there are a number of 
arguments against this method. This will be elaborated further in Chapter 3. 
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Another central term in this work is the concept of diversity. The diversity of a 
municipality is based on the municipalities’ cleavage structure, and in general, we can 
say that a municipality is more diverse the more subgroups there are in a 
municipality, and the more those subgroups approach each other in size. In Chapter 3, 
the concept of diversity is specified further and we argue in favour of the assumption 
that size is positively related to the level of diversity, which means that larger 
municipalities are assumed to be more diverse than smaller ones. 
1.2.3 Political conflict 
It is crucial at this stage of the work to have a clear idea of which mechanism ties 
municipality size and individual political participation together. For most readers it 
has become clear already that political conflict plays a central role here. Political 
conflict is defined as a disagreement around the outcome of the political process. 
Political conflict is conceptualized by characteristics of the party competition in the 
individual municipal councils. The detailed conceptualization of political conflict is 
discussed in Chapter 4. 
The key assumption of the relationship between size and conflict is that larger (and 
therefore more diverse) municipalities are characterized by a higher level of political 
conflict. Further, it will be argued that a higher level of political conflict mobilizes 
inhabitants in a municipality to participate in local politics (Deutsch 1961). 
1.2.4 Political participation 
The understanding of political participation applied here is in accordance with a 
definition presented by Verba et al. (1995). They define political participation as an  
"[…] activity that has the intend or effect of influencing government 
action – either directly by affecting the making or implementation of 
public policy or indirectly by influencing the selection of people who 
make those policies." (Verba et al. 1995: 38).  
Of course, in the context of this work it is not national government action, but the 
action of local political authorities that are in the focus of the participants. It is 
important to point out, like Verba and his colleagues did, that the focus is on 
voluntary activity, this means not obligatory or paid political behavior. 
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As a consequence of the conceptualization of political conflict by party 
competition in the municipal council, we will focus on forms of participation that 
attempt to influence the decisions of the municipal council (as the highest political 
body of a municipality). This might be done indirectly, by participating in local 
elections that determine the composition of the municipal council. Or alternatively, 
directly by contacting the most important actors within the municipal council 
personally. The most important actors in the municipal council are the elected 
representatives and the local political party organizations. 
Consequentially, three forms of political participation are considered as dependent 
variables in this work: participation in local elections, contacting elected 
representatives, and contacting a local political party. 
1.2.5 Specification of the research hypothesis 
At last, we have arrived at a point where we can specify the research problem further. 
The following three hypotheses summarize the research problem: 
Hypothesis 1: 
The larger a municipality, the more diverse is its population. 
Hypothesis 2: 
The larger and more diverse a municipality, the higher is the level of political 
conflict within this municipality. 
Hypothesis 3: 
The higher the level of conflict within a municipality, the higher is the 
likelihood of political participation among its residents. We suppose here that 
the political interest of the residents mediate the effect of conflict on participation. 
In sum, these three hypotheses suggest a positive relationship between municipality 
size and the level of participation; the likelihood of political participation increases 
when we move from smaller to larger municipalities. This assumption is obviously 
not in accordance with findings in the empirical studies presented earlier. 
Nonetheless, the logic behind the three hypotheses is convincing, as will become 
clear in Chapter 3. However, when the analysis of our empirical material does not 
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Figure 1.1: Graphical presentation of the main assumptions in this work 
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support our assumption of a positive relationship between size and the level of 
participation, it is of interest to see which one of our three hypotheses cannot be 
validated. 
1.3 The data material 
We consider two levels of analysis in this work. One level of analysis is the structural 
or macro level. On this level, we use aggregated data to describe characteristics of the 
municipalities. Municipality size, the degree of diversity and the level of conflict are 
measured on this level of analysis. At this level of analysis, we use data from “The 
Commune Database” which is administered by the Norwegian Social Science Data 
Service (NSD). This database constitutes a collection of various statistics from 
different sources on the municipal level (however, all statistics employed here, are 
produced by Statistics Norway (SSB)). 
These structural data were combined with data on the individual or micro level. On 
this level, we measure the degree of interest in politics, the actual participation in 
politics, and various control variables. The individual data were from a survey carried 
out within the project “Size and local democracy in Norway”. Responsible for this 
project is Lawrence Rose at the University of Oslo, Department of Political Science3. 
The sampling design for the “Size and local democracy in Norway”-survey was 
rather complicated. The selection of respondents was carried out in two stages. First, 
all Norwegian municipalities were stratified into eight strata according to their size. 
                                            
3
 Of course, either NSD or Lawrence Rose is responsible for the analysis or the interpretations of the data that are carried 
out in this work. 
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Table 1.1: The distribution of Norwegian municipalities by eight strata 
Stratum Residents Number of municipalities in stratum 
Number of municipalities 
in sample 
1 – 2 500 129 8 
2 2 501 – 5 000 117 8 
3 5 001 – 7 500 61 8 
4 7 501 – 10 000 28 8 
5 10 001 – 15 000 38 8 
6 15 501 – 25 000 30 8 
7 25 001 – 50 000 22 8 
8 50 000 – 10 8 
 – 435 64 
 
Thereafter, eight municipalities were selected from each stratum, which means that a 
total of 64 municipalities were in the survey. The stratification was necessary to 
achieve sufficient variation in the size of the municipalities in the sample. Table 1.1 
outlines the characteristics of the eight strata. This division of municipalities into 
eight strata is also used in the forthcoming chapters to structure the presentation of 
the results of the data analysis. In the second stage of the sampling procedure, a 
number of inhabitants within each of the 64 municipalities were selected. The 
objective was to seek a sample of about 30 individuals in each municipality. 
This sampling design allows us to analyze the effect of different structural 
conditions on the residents’ behavior. Unfortunately, the sample is not representative 
for the Norwegian population as a whole. There is a sampling bias in each step of the 
sampling procedure. In the first stage of the sampling process, smaller municipalities 
have a smaller probability to be selected into the sample than larger ones. In the 
second stage, on the other hand, the residents in smaller municipalities have a larger 
chance to be selected than the residents in larger municipalities. The data estimate 
therefore unbiased descriptive statistics for each municipality, but in order to estimate 
unbiased descriptive statistics for the whole Norwegian population we have to weight 
the individual respondents differently. 
The methods used to gather information from these respondents was a combination 
of a telephone interview and a postal survey. Altogether, 3259 respondents were in 
the sample and 1624 of these answered both, the telephone and the postal part of the 
survey. After the deletion of respondents with to many missing answers, 1560 
respondents were finally used in this analysis. 
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1.4 Plan of the book 
In order to structure the quite complex relationship between municipality size and 
political participation, we will attempt to create a general framework of the 
relationship between these two variables in the next chapter. The hypotheses 
presented above will be placed within this framework, and variables that might have a 
confounding effect on the relationship between size and participation will be 
identified. In Chapter 3, we discuss the theoretical foundation of the research 
hypotheses in more detail. 
Thereafter, in Chapter 4, we discuss the empirical measurement of our theoretical 
constructs. Then the actual empirical testing of the hypotheses follows in Chapter 5 
and Chapter 6. In Chapter 5, we investigate the relationship between the variables 
measured on the structural level, while Chapter 6 combines the structural and 
individual level data by carrying out a multilevel analysis. Finally, we summarize our 
findings and draw our conclusions in Chapter 7. 
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2. Size and participation – some general 
observations 
The hypotheses presented in the introductory chapter are only one imaginable 
connection between municipality size and political participation. One can think about 
a vast number of alternative hypotheses that link municipality size and political 
participation together. This variety of hypotheses can be illustrated by the two 
opposing hypotheses proposed by Verba & Nie (1972), which we have mentioned 
earlier. The objective of this chapter is it therefore to give a systematic presentation 
of the variety of possible connections between size and participation, and to present 
the most important factors that have to be considered in this context. 
We will therefore start this chapter by discussing characteristics of municipalities 
that can be assumed to change with the number of residents. Thereafter, we will 
briefly discuss our approach on the explanation of individual action and attempt to 
identify the most important variables that influence the individual decision to 
participate in politics or not to participate. The characteristics of municipalities that 
change with municipality size, and the most important factors that influence the 
individual decision to participate in politics, are combined into a general framework 
of size and participation, which will be presented in section 2.1.3. 
By placing our initial set of hypotheses within this framework we get a better idea 
of which additional variables might confound the effect of municipality size on 
political participation. The general framework is therefore a good instrument to 
identify potential control variables. At the end of this chapter, we were therefore able 
to specify the complete model of analysis that will be the subject of the analysis in the 
remainder of this work. 
2.1 An approach on size and democracy 
The assumption that size alone does not have any effect on the level of participation 
is central in this work. A number of other variables mediate the effect between size 
and the level of participation. Those variables either covariate with or are determined 
by the number of residents within a municipality. Together, these variables create 
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distinct contexts of participation in municipalities of different sizes, where the context 
of participation is a label for all circumstances that are significant for the individual 
decision to participate in politics. This means that the individuals who live in 
different municipalities, are confronted with a distinct set of opportunities and 
restraints with regard to participation, and this distinct set is assumed to be correlated 
with municipality size. In this way, a certain context makes participation more likely, 
while another context makes it less likely. This is also true for different forms of 
participation. A certain context makes the participation in some kinds of participatory 
acts more likely than in other forms of participation. 
 
Figure 2.1: The relationship between size and political participation 
 
Municipality 
size 
Individual 
characterisics 
Political 
participation 
The context of participation 
Other factors outside the 
context of participation 
It is also reasonable to assume that some characteristics of the population correlate 
with the size of a municipality. However, within this conception of the relationship 
between size and participation, it is not assumed that the individual characteristics of 
a person are completely dependent on the municipal context. Other factors outside the 
context of participation are certainly relevant as well. Even if it is reasonable to claim 
that some kinds of relevant individual characteristics (like education or attitudinal 
variables) are correlated with the context of participation to some degree, some other 
characteristics (like preferences) might not be affected by the municipal context at all. 
The individuals act within the context of participation as independent actors, while 
some characteristics of the individuals correlate with this context. 
Figure 2.1 outlines the assumed relationship. It is important to point out that the 
arrows in the figure do not indicate causal relationships but rather the existence of a 
 17
high degree of correlation. The four elements in Figure 2.1 are rather theoretical 
concepts at this stage of the work. Therefore, the following sections try to fill these 
concepts with empirical content. 
2.1.1 The context of participation 
When we talk about the context of participation, it is important to identify the main 
social and structural factors that are likely be correlated with unicipality size. It is 
important that these factors in turn are relevant for the individual decision to 
participate in politics. Among all the possible differences between municipalities of 
distinct sizes, two factors seem to be of special importance here. These are the 
composition of the population with regard to various social characteristics and the 
characteristics of the political system within a municipality. In addition, a residual 
category is necessary that embraces factors that cannot be classified in the two 
categories mentioned. Consequently, three dimensions characterize the context of 
participation: 
The social characteristics of the inhabitants in municipalities (such as the level of 
education or their income) are assumed to correspond with size. There might be a 
number of reasons for this situation, like for instance differences in the economic 
structure, or distinct education possibilities. 
Second, the character of the political system is likely to vary in municipalities of 
different sizes. The complexity of the bureaucratic system, the distance between 
politicians and citizens, or the absolute size of the electorate, are examples for 
possible factors in this dimension. 
Finally, other social and structural factors correspond with changes in municipality 
size. Here we can think of factors like the average distance between residents and 
the municipal centre, the probability that a resident works and lives in the same 
municipality, the economic structure of a municipality, or the character of the 
social interaction between the residents within a municipality. 
Figure 2.2 illustrates the relationship between the size of a municipality and the 
context of participation. 
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Figure 2.2: The relationship between size and the context of participation 
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It is clear that size alone does not only have a direct effect on these three dimensions. 
The three dimensions are likely to be correlated with each other as well (which is 
indicated by the sprinkled arrows in the figure). Therefore, it is reasonable to assume 
that the effect of size on one dimension also might be indirect, mediated through one 
of the other dimensions (or another variable on the same dimension). An example for 
this is the assumption that larger municipalities are likely to have residents with 
higher education. The logic behind this assumption is that larger municipalities have 
a higher level of socioeconomic development than smaller municipalities (Dahl & 
Tufte 1974: 31ff). This means among other things that the economic structure of 
larger municipalities is largely characterized by industry and service production, 
while it is the agricultural sector that prevails in the smaller municipalities. With 
other words, is this a statement of a direct relationship between size and our 
dimension of “Other social and structural factors”. Nevertheless, this change of the 
economic structure when we move from smaller to larger municipalities, is likely to 
have an effect on the distribution of social characteristics among the population as 
well. A consequence for this might be that the population in larger municipalities has 
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a higher degree of education and because of this a higher average income than 
residents in smaller municipalities have. 
2.1.2 Individual characteristics 
Let us now consider the relevant individual characteristics. The objective with this 
section is it to identify the most important factors for explaining individual action in 
general, and individual political participation in particular. In order to achieve this, it 
is crucial to have an idea about the mechanisms that are at work when individuals 
decide to participate in politics, or rather decide not to do this. This is, however, a 
controversial issue because there are a number of conceptions about why humans act. 
In this work, we apply an approach that considers individuals as rational actors. In 
order to make this selection of a decision theory explicit, a brief discussion of the 
rational choice approach precedes the identification of the most important individual 
factors for political participation. 
Individual decision theory 
A basic assumption within this work is the belief that the individual decision to 
participate in politics is based on rational considerations concerning the benefits and 
costs of the act. This is the key assumption in the rational choice approach (Downs 
1957; Riker & Ordeshook 1973). According to this approach, a person engages only 
in politics when the expected benefits of the engagement exceed its assumed costs. 
The benefits that an individual achieves from participating in politics are numerous. 
The most obvious benefit results from the possibility to influence a political decision 
in a way that it is in accordance with the participator’s self-interest. This is called a 
collective benefit because it is not possible to exclude any member of the political 
system from enjoying the political outcome that has been achieved by the 
participators. Therefore, it is most rational for an individual not to engage in politics, 
which means not to bear any of the costs, but to enjoy the benefits from the work of 
the others that have participated. It is therefore a paradox that such a large number of 
persons still participate in elections and other political acts, despite the logic of the 
rational choice approach. In the literature, this paradox is sometimes called for the 
“Paradox of Voting” (Downs 1957). 
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In order to solve the paradox and to give a reason for why individuals still engage 
in politics, a number of political scientists employ a wider comprehension of benefits. 
They assume that there are not only collective benefits, but also benefits that are 
connected directly to the participatory action. These benefits are special in the sense 
that the actor alone only can experience them; they are so called selective benefits 
(Riker & Ordeshook 1973; Verba et al. 1995; Wilson 1995). Verba et al. (1995) 
mention for instance three potential selective benefits that might be connected with 
the execution of a political act: material benefits such as enhancing career 
possibilities, social gratifications such as enjoying being together with other people, 
and civic gratifications such as doing the duty as a citizen (Verba et al. 1995: 111-
112). These selective benefits are assumed so important for some participators, that 
they bear the costs of the act. In this way, selective benefits seem to resolve the 
paradox of participation. 
However, there are still some disadvantages with this approach. One problem with 
this approach, despite of its theoretical plausibility, is that it is difficult to test the 
approach empirically. The supporters of the view state that individuals participate 
because the benefits exceeds the costs of participation, but which combination of 
selective and collective benefits exceeds, for instance, the cost of demonstrating one 
hour to prevent the implementation of a decision made by the municipal council? Is it 
enough with the social gratification of having a good time with friends combined 
with a collective benefit, which in this case is the possible prevention of the political 
decision? Or, because it was bad weather, we have also to consider the civic 
gratification of having done something about a decision that is perceived to be 
unjust? It is difficult to identify general guidelines about which gratifications or 
benefits are more important, and in which contexts this is true. However, without 
such a guideline a researcher has only to dig in the potential benefits of a person and 
is nearly guaranteed to find some selective benefits that justify the participation. 
Since the individual has participated, there must be more benefits than costs and one 
has only to find these benefits. Verba and his colleagues were aware of this point as 
well. They remarked that 
 21
“[a]ny attempt to base a rational actor explanation of political activity 
on motivations by expanding the range of types of allowable 
preferences results in a tautology” (Verba et al. 2000: 267).  
Another objection to the use of selective benefits in a rational choice approach is that 
the focus of participation shifts from political to personal reasons. Previously, we 
defined political participation as an activity that has the intention to affect political 
decisions (see section 1.2.4). However, when the main reason for participation 
becomes the experience of selective benefits, the political dimension of the action 
becomes secondary. An individual is no longer attending a meeting of the municipal 
council with the aim of exerting pressure on the political decision-makers, but 
because this might promote his career in the municipality, by getting in contact with a 
number of influential persons in this way. 
This illustrates that the basic logic behind the rational choice approach is not 
without problems, and there are a number of other objections (Almond 1991). 
Nevertheless, it must be the ultimate aim with a decision-theory to explain human 
action with only a limited number of variables. A theory has to simplify reality by 
emphasizing on a smaller number of variables and at the same time ignoring many 
other potentially important variables. In this respect, the rational choice approach 
accomplishes what it is supposed to do, by presenting the researcher to a smaller set 
of variables that give a quite intuitive explanation of when and how humans engage 
in political activities. However, irrespective of the specification of benefits chosen, a 
rational explanation of political activity should always dependent on a conception of 
benefits that have a political dimension. Therefore, the assumption that individuals 
try to influence political decisions to be in accordance with its self-interest should be 
a minimum requirement for the explanation of political participation. 
One possible solution is it to ignore the problem with specifying the appropriate set 
of benefits, and to focus rather on the costs of participation and the resources needed 
to meet the costs. In this way, we leave the attempt of applying a general explanation 
theory, and use rather a pragmatic set of assumptions in order to explain political 
participation. Verba and his colleagues formulate the key assumption in this way: 
“[…] they found that political activities vary in their resource 
requirements and that individuals vary in their resource endowments. 
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This variation across both acts and individuals provided opportunities 
for exploring who participates in what ways” (Verba et al. 2000: 265). 
This approach to the explanation of participation can be labelled as resource-based 
explanation of participation (Verba et al. 1995, 2000; Rosenstone & Hansen 1993). 
Its basic assumption is that the people that have a large amount of those resources 
that are necessary to participate in a certain activity will be more likely to participate. 
For those persons are the costs of participation not so high (relatively spoken), and 
therefore, the benefits will easier exceed the costs. If we take the resource of money 
as an example, is it reasonable to assume that a person that earns many millions a 
year is more likely to donate some 100 000 to a political organization, than a person 
that only has an income of 200 000 a year. This is a quite plausible assumption. With 
this in mind, let us now proceed to identify the most important factors that affect the 
individual decision to participate in politics. 
Important individual factors 
The Civic Voluntarism model presented by Verba and his colleagues (1995) 
summarizes the most important factors that influence the decision to participate in 
politics, or not to participate. The model introduces three factors that are supposed to 
account for political participation. 
“[…] one helpful way to understand the three factors is to invert the 
usual question and ask instead why people do not become political 
activists. Three answers come to mind: because they can’t; because they 
don’t want to; or because nobody asked. In other words, people may be 
inactive because they lack resources, because they lack psychological 
engagement with politics, or because they are outside of the recruitment 
networks that bring people to politics.” (Verba et al. 1995: 269, italics 
in the original) 
Of these three factors, resources and engagement are more important than 
recruitment. Political participation might take place without recruitment, but the 
availability of resources and the existence of engagement is a necessary condition for 
political action. 
Resources refer, as mentioned earlier, to inputs from the participant that are 
necessary to execute a certain form of political activity. For instance, does a donation 
of money require that the participant has money to its disposition. Verba et al. use a 
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pragmatic approach and emphasize three kinds of resources as relevant: time, money, 
and civic skills. They define the resource of civic skills as “[…] the communications 
and organizational abilities that allow citizens to use time and money effectively in 
political life” (Verba et al 1995: 304). 
With the term psychological engagement, Verba et al. refer to a number of 
psychological predispositions that have been shown to be relevant for the explanation 
of political participation. Important to mention in this context are political attitudes, 
such as political interest, an individual’s sense of efficacy or the identification with a 
party. The individual’s sense of efficacy is in the literature often defined in two ways: 
the term internal efficacy refers to a person’s “ability to understand politics and to 
participate in politics” (Rosenstone & Hanse 1993: 15), while the term external 
efficacy means a person’s sense that his “political activities can influence what the 
government actually does” (Rosenstone & Hansen 1993: 15). 
Further feelings of gratifications, which were mentioned above a one example of 
selective benefits, might also emanate from psychological factors. The personal 
commitment to civic values or the wish to implement a certain political decision were 
examples for this kind of psychological factors. In the opinion of the author, is it 
important to differentiate between psychological predispositions that might trigger 
personal gratification and other kinds of psychological engagement factors (which we 
will call political attitudes throughout this work). Of course, this is a differentiation, 
which is not always clear and might be difficult to apply in some instances. 
In the context of this work, psychological predispositions that are the origin for 
feelings of gratifications are not relevant, for reasons mentioned earlier when we 
discussed the use of selective benefits in the rational choice approach. Nonetheless, 
are psychological factors important for the execution of political activities. Political 
attitudes, such as political interest or the sense of effectiveness might be important 
here. When a person is not interested in politics, this person will not participate in 
politics despite the availability of the necessary resources. In the opinion of the 
author, an argumentation, which is in line with the resource-based explanation of 
political participation mentioned earlier, might be true for political attitudes as well. It 
is reasonable to assume that different forms of participation vary with regard to which 
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political attitudes are required from the participant. Modes of participation that have 
an individual character and require a high amount of resources like money or time 
might attract persons with a high sense of political efficacy to a larger degree than 
other persons. The same might be true for political interest. Forms of political 
participation that aim to influence decisions of a more collective nature, such as 
voting, require participants that are generally interested in politics. On the other hand, 
for forms of participation that have a more particularized scope of outcome, meaning 
that the outcome only has personal consequences for the participant, political interest 
might not be relevant (Verba & Nie 1972: 54). 
The participatory act of contacting politicians and parties is an ambiguous form of 
participation with regard to the scope of the outcome. Consequentially, the relevance 
of interest in politics is not clear. A resident in a municipality might contact a local 
politician in order to promote a personal interest, for instance to achieve a faster 
processing of a building permit. However, the resident might also contact a politician 
on behalf of the whole neighbourhood, for instance to achieve noise reduction 
measure along a major road that passes through the neighbourhood. In the first case, 
interest in politics is not a precondition for the participation because personal motives 
are the primary reason behind the action. In the latter case, on the other hand, interest 
in politics might be a precondition for the act of contacting the politician. 
Unfortunately, our data material does not allow us to distinct between the scope of 
outcome that lies behind the contact of a resident with a party or a politician. In 
addition, according to data from the United States, is the collective outcome the most 
important reason for contacting. Verba et al. find that “[…] the subject of about one 
in five contacts at each level of government was a matter of particularized concern.” 
(Verba et al. 1995: 57). When we assume that the findings from the United States are 
representative for Norway, we can conclude that a resident’s interest in politic is 
relevant for our measure of contacting as well. 
A major problem with political attitudes is the problem of causality. The direction 
of the causal effect is uncertain. Is the political attitude prior to the act of 
participation? O is it the other way around; is the attitude a result of the political 
engagement? In order to find an answer to this problem, we need special data that 
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measure the character of a person’s political attitude before and after the engagement 
in politics. Since we do not have this type of data available, we solve this problem by 
explicitly stating the assumption that political attitudes are prior to the participatory 
activity. 
The third factor mentioned by Verba et al. (1995) is recruitment networks. 
Rosenstone & Hansen (1993) consider this factor also under the label of political 
mobilization. They define mobilization as “[…] the process by which candidates, 
parties, activists, and groups induce people to participate” (Rosenstone & Hansen 
1993: 25). These actors can mobilize people in two ways. Directly by contacting 
citizens personally and encourage them to participate, or indirectly through mutual 
associates (Rosenstone & Hansen 1993: 26). A general assumption, made by both 
Verb and his colleagues and Rosenstone & Hansen, is that the recruiters act rational 
when they recruit people to politics. The rationality becomes evident in two ways: on 
which persons the recruiter target an attempt of recruitment, and when the recruiters 
attempt to recruit (the timing of the recruitment process) (Rosenstone & Hansen 
1993). 
With regard to the target group of an attempt of recruitment, it is reasonable to 
assume that recruiters contact persons that are most likely to say yes, and that are able 
to participate in politics in an effective way. Therefore, persons with a high degree of 
resources are most likely the targets for an attempt of recruitment. When we consider 
the timing of the recruitment process, it is clear that some situations make it easier to 
mobilize persons to politics. This might be a situation in which salient issues top the 
agenda, or when important decisions are pending. Another situation where 
mobilization is more likely to be successful is when outputs hang in the balance, and 
only a few more participators could make the difference (Rosenstone & Hansen 1993: 
25 ff). Figure 2.3 summarizes the discussion about the most important factors that 
influence political participation. 
Resources, political attitudes, and recruitment networks are relevant in this work as 
long as it is reasonable to assume that these individual factors vary with the size of a 
municipality. Consequently, since different forms of participation require the 
availability of distinct resources, it is reasonable to assume that not only the general 
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Figure 2.3: The relationship between individual factors and political participation 
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level of participation might be different between municipalities of different size, but 
also the level of participation in distinct forms of participation. 
A final point is it to emphasize that these three individual factors (resources, 
attitudes and recruitment) are likely to be related to each other (as Figure 2.3 
indicates). The level of education, which is an important background variable in this 
context, can illustrate this. A high level of education is very likely to be positively 
related to the income and the degree of civil skills of a person. In addition to this, do 
persons with a longer education probably have a higher sense of efficacy and perhaps 
a higher interest in politics. Finally, persons that have a higher level of income and 
education are more “likely to be asked by institutions to take part in politics” (Verba 
et al. 1995: 376). Certainly, these relationships between resources, attitudes and 
recruitment is not necessarily dependent on a background variable that ties them 
together. It is clear, that a higher amount of civic skills alone might increase the 
subjective sense of effectiveness of a person purely because this person feels that she 
can argue and communicate requests to the political decision-makers. 
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2.1.3 A general framework of the relationship between size and participation 
After having identified the most important elements of the context of participation 
and the most crucial individual factors, we are now able to set up a general 
framework. At this place, it is important to point out that this framework does not 
attempt to give a complete description of the relationship between size and 
participation. It is rather supposed to highlight the most crucial factors in this respect, 
in the eyes of the author. Figure 2.4 summarizes this attempt. 
 
Figure 2.4: The general framework of the relationship between size and 
participation 
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For reasons of simplicity, the interactions between the elements within the context of 
participation and between the individual factors are omitted. In addition, the 
relationship between the two boxes is, in reality, more complex as indicated by the 
one arrow. Theoretically, each structural variable might affect the individual 
characteristics among the residents within a municipality. However, some 
connections might be more likely than others might. The composition of the 
population within a municipality and the other structural variables are likely to be 
related with all three individual characteristics, while the characteristic of the political 
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system can be assumed to have an effect mainly on the political attitudes of the 
population. 
This general framework is not only giving an overall view over the potential 
relationships between municipality size and individual political participation. It helps 
also to differentiate between the two levels of analysis that is typical for analyses that 
investigate the effect of structural factors on individual action. In this way, it forces 
the investigator to think explicitly about the mechanisms that transform structural 
variables into individual participation. 
2.2 The analytical model 
Let us now return to the set of hypotheses that have been introduced in the first 
chapter. All together, those hypotheses constitute what we, in the following, call the 
analytical model of this work. How do these hypotheses fit into the general 
framework outlined above? 
The first hypothesis states an assumption about the size of a municipality and the 
composition of its residents with regard to particular social background variables – 
the larger a municipality, the more diverse composed is its population. 
The second hypothesis assumes that larger and more diverse municipalities have a 
higher level of political conflict within the municipality than municipalities that are 
smaller or less diverse. The level of political conflict can be classified as a feature of 
the political system within our general framework. More precisely the assumption 
should be formulated in a way to make clear that size and diversity have its own 
effect on the level of conflict. Given the size of a municipality, an increase in the 
diversity of this municipality is supposed to increase the level of political conflict. 
Moreover, given the level of diversity within a municipality, an increase of its size is 
assumed to increase the level of conflict. The second hypothesis makes therefore two 
claims. First, that there is a direct relationship between size and the character of the 
political system. And second, that a relationship between two structural variables 
within the context of participation exists - between the composition of the population 
and the character of the political system. 
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Figure 2.5: The analytical model within our general framework 
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The third hypothesis is again in two parts. The first part states an assumption about 
the effect of the character of the political system on individual characteristics: the 
higher the level of conflict, the more interested are the residents in local politics. The 
second part concludes the analytical chain by stating a supposition about the 
individual characteristics and the likelihood to participate in politics: the more 
interested a person is in politics, the more likely is it that this person is participating 
in politics. 
These assumptions are presented in Figure 2.5, which takes the previous 
presentation of the general framework as a starting point in order to show the 
similarities between these two approaches. 
It is important to point out that this work employs a conceptualization of political 
conflict as a structural variable. This might be a drawback, because structural 
measures of political conflict do not have to be decisive for the individual decision to 
participate. It is rather the degree of conflict that the individual resident perceives 
which might be decisive. These two conceptualizations of political conflict are 
entirely different. The individual perception of political conflict is dependent on a 
number of other factors, which might weaken or strengthen the experience of a 
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political conflict. Such factors can be the importance of the conflict issue to the 
individual resident or the character of the conflict issue. Conflicts around religious 
issues or discussions about values might be perceived as being more controversial 
than conflicts around the allocation of material resources or localization issues. A 
structural measure, however, does not measure these differences in the individual 
comprehension of a political conflict. 
Actually, the relationship between the level of conflict and political interest is a 
relationship on the individual level. And the mechanisms that determine the 
individual perception of the level of political conflict, dependent on the diversity of 
the municipality, are those that link the structural and individual level together – the 
constitute the “micro-macro link”. Certainly, it would be complex to model that link, 
and due to limitations in our data material, it would not be possible to test these 
assumptions empirically. Therefore, the solution that has been chosen here – the 
conceptualization of political conflict as a structural variable – can be regarded as a 
rather large simplification compared to an “ideal” analytical model. Consequentially, 
it is important to have this characteristic in mind when drawing conclusions from the 
results of our data analysis. 
2.2.1 The control variables 
In order to complete the specification of the analytical model, it is important to 
consider potential control variables. This is necessary because of the variety of 
potential relationships that might exist between size and political participation. 
Therefore, in order to achieve a correct estimation of the direct relationship between 
size and participation we have to control this relationship for potential indirect effects 
between size and participation. The same should be done for all the other variables in 
the analytical model, but this would result in a statistical analysis that would be too 
complex. Consequentially, the focus here is on the relationship between size and 
participation.  
Not every variable that is correlated with the size of a municipality has to be 
included into the statistical analysis as a control variable. Only those variables that 
are assumed to be correlated with both variables, the size of a municipality and the 
level of political participation, are of interest. 
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In the context of this work, the education level of the residents in a municipality 
seems to be of particular interest. As discussed earlier, can the average level of 
education be assumed to covariate with the size of a municipality? At the same time 
is the level of education expected to be related to a number of individual 
characteristics that, in turn, are supposed to have an effect on participation. The most 
important variables in this respect are the resource variables of income and civic 
skills. In addition, is the sense of political efficacy relevant here. Finally, the 
likelihood of being recruited can be assumed higher as well. 
 
Figure 2.6: The control variables within our framework of analysis 
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However, other factors than the level of education might affect the likelihood for 
participation as well. Bjørklund & Sørensen (1990) point out that the municipal 
council is larger, relatively spoken, in smaller municipalities than in larger ones. This 
may result in a situation where a larger proportion of residents in smaller 
municipalities have experience with being an elected local representative, and that 
this might have an impact on the likelihood of participating in certain forms of 
participation (Bjørklund & Sørensen 1990: 40). To have experience from the 
municipal council must be regarded as particular significant for the political act of 
contacting elected representatives or a local party. This experience might affect the 
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individual sense of political efficacy, since the person knows how the system works, 
and who the appropriate person to contact is. On the other side is it reasonable to 
assume that the experience of being a member of the municipal council integrates this 
person in a social network where it is more likely to be recruited to political activity. 
Figure 2.6 outlines the fully specified model of analysis. 
As we can see from the figure, the control variables that should be included into 
the analysis are: the level of education, household income, civic skills, two 
measurements of the sense of effectiveness, and the experience as a representative in 
the municipal council. All of these variables are measured on the individual level. 
There are certainly a number of other variables that would be important to be 
considered as control variables in this context. However, only those that are 
considered the most significant variables are included in the analysis, in order to limit 
the complexity of the statistical analysis. The selection of control variables is a 
subjective decision, and can obviously be the subject of discussion.  
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3. The analytical model – theoretical 
considerations 
As we have seen previously, is the relationship between municipality size and 
political participation rather complex. Therefore, the main objective of this chapter is 
it to demonstrate the plausibility of the analytical model, which we have presented in 
more detail in the previous chapters. This will be done with the help of logical 
arguments and empirical findings. The most important questions, that we need to 
concentrate on, can be deduced directly from the hypotheses (presented in section 
1.2.5), and can be expressed like that: Why should larger municipalities be more 
diverse? What lies behind the assumption that larger and/or more diverse 
municipalities have a higher level of political conflict? And finally, why is it 
reasonable to expect that municipalities with a higher level of conflict have residents 
that, on average, are more interested in politics and, in turn, participate more often? 
In the attempt to answer these questions, we will often take the point of view of 
Dahl & Tufte (1973) as a starting point and adding further evidence to their line of 
thinking. We start this chapter with a discussion of the assumption that larger 
municipalities are more diverse. Thereafter, the relationship between size and 
diversity, on one side, and political conflict on the other side is considered. Here, it is 
important to identify the most important mechanisms that transfer a municipality’s 
size and diversity into political conflict. We will argue that a municipality’s group 
structure is the connection between size, diversity and conflict. Finally, we consider 
the determinants of participation. In this section, we will illustrate how we imagine 
that the group structure of a municipality, the level of conflict and the likelihood of 
participation are related to each other. 
3.1 The relationship between size and diversity 
In the course of this work, we apply a definition of diversity, which is originally from 
Dahl & Tufte (1973). They define the concept of diversity by two dimensions, and 
consider municipalities more diverse 
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“[…] (1) the greater the number of subsets into which the population is 
divided, or (2) the more nearly the subsets approach each other in size, 
or both. […] Here, we propose to call a difference on either dimension a 
difference in categoric diversity.” (Dahl & Tufte 1973: 31; italics in the 
original) 
The cleavage structure of a municipality can be used to illustrate the concept of 
diversity further. With regard to the first dimension – the number of subgroups – a 
municipality can be more diverse than another municipality in two ways: First, all 
other things being equal, a municipality that has a larger number of manifest 
cleavages can be considered as being more diverse than a municipality with fewer 
manifest cleavages. And second, all other things being equal, a municipality that has 
a larger number of subgroups along its manifest cleavages can be thought of as more 
diverse than a municipality with fewer subgroups. This means that a municipality 
that, for instance, is divided into four subgroups, is considered as less diverse when 
all subgroups are ordered along one cleavage, compared to a municipality where the 
subgroups are distributed between two cleavage lines. In addition, the relative size of 
the subgroups has to be considered as well – the second dimension of Dahl & Tufte’s 
definition. When all other things are equal, then those municipalities that consist of 
subgroups that approach each other in size to a larger degree are considered as more 
diverse. 
The concept of diversity can be thought of as a scale, which ranges from the 
extreme point of maximal homogeneity to the other extreme point of maximal 
heterogeneity. When the population of a municipality only belongs to one group, we 
can talk of a situation with maximal homogeneity. The definition of a situation with 
maximal heterogeneity, on the other hand, is more difficult. A large number of 
cleavage lines with many subgroups that approach each other in size characterize a 
heterogeneous municipality. However, there is always a theoretical possibility that 
another municipality is more diverse. The diversity scale is, with other words, not 
limited at this end.  
In the opinion of Dahl & Tufte, two kinds of categoric diversity are of especial 
interest: “cultural diversity (variation in language, religion, race, or region) and 
socioeconomic diversity (variation in occupation, education, income, wealth, and the 
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like)” (ibid.: 31; italics in the original). Dahl & Tufte continue with discussing the 
factors that determine the level of diversity in municipalities, and they identify size as 
an important factor that influences the level of diversity in a municipality. They claim 
that “[w]ithin countries, smaller communities tend to be relatively homogenous, 
larger communities relatively heterogeneous” (ibid.: 33). They give a number of 
reasons for why larger municipalities should be more diverse. 
The first reason for the positive relationship between municipality size and the 
level of diversity is the socioeconomic development of a municipality. Dahl & Tufte 
mean that 
“[t]he size of a community within a country is in turn related to its level 
of socioeconomic development: a small community is more likely to be 
oriented toward agriculture or to have a relatively simple economic 
structure, whereas a large city is more likely to be economically 
“advanced”.” (ibid.: 33) 
Moreover, a municipality that has a higher level of socioeconomic development 
(which is related to factors like industrialization, urbanization, higher income, the 
decline of the agricultural sector, education and the like) is assumed to create 
specialized roles and organisations. This development results in a more diverse 
society. 
However, not only the socioeconomic development leads to the creation of new 
roles and organizations. When a political unit increases in population size and area 
this often results in problems of communication and control within this unit. “[…] 
[T]he search for effective means of communication and control seems to produce a 
powerful tendency within any organization to break down into subunits as it grows in 
size” (ibid.: 36). Therefore, the following assumption seems plausible: “Other things 
being equal – particularly the socioeconomic level – the larger the population of a 
political system, the greater the number of organizations and subunits it will contain” 
(ibid.: 36). This increase in the number of subunits will certainly increase the 
diversity of a political system, because 
 “[e]very organization or subunit tends to develop its own interests or 
goals, along with leaders and other members willing to invest time, 
energy, and wit to achieve them. To this extend, organizations and 
subunits tend to become interest groups” (ibid.: 39). 
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Consequentially, larger political systems have to be broken down into smaller 
subunits, and this process increases the number of political relevant groups within the 
political system as a whole. 
Dahl & Tufte give another argument that backs up under the assumption of a 
positive relationship between the number of interest groups and the size of a political 
unit. They assume that there is a “lower threshold of size below which it is unlikely 
that a separate interest group will be organized” (ibid.: 39). For instance, let us 
consider a minority group that is distributed equally over the whole country, and 
consists therefore of the same share of residents in all municipalities. In this case, it is 
clear that the absolute number of members in the minority group is higher in larger 
municipalities as it is in smaller municipalities. Further, this line of reasoning 
assumes that larger groups become institutionalized and politically organized more 
easily than smaller groups do. A certain number of members within one group are 
necessary in order to support institutions like newspapers or clubs, or to provide clear 
identity for the members of a minority group (Fischer 1982). The same is true for the 
foundation of political organizations, such as political parties or interest groups. The 
idea of positive relationship between size of a municipality and the level of diversity 
do we also find in the work of urban sociologists, and here most recently in the work 
of Fischer (1975, 1982, 1995) and his “Subcultural Theory of Urbanism”. Fischer 
supports the idea of a threshold, or critical mass, that a group must exceed in order to 
be capable to execute certain functions. Fischer points also to another mechanism that 
might reinforce the relationship between size and diversity. He points out that larger 
municipalities attract people from the districts (Fischer 1995: 545), and of those that 
move from the district to the centre in a country, it is likely that minority groups 
might be overrepresented. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that minority groups 
are larger, in absolute and relative terms, in larger municipalities than they are in 
smaller municipalities. Consequentially, subgroups in larger municipalities are more 
likely to approach each other in size than subgroups in smaller municipalities. 
Other scientists share the idea of a positive relationship between municipality size 
and the degree of diversity (see Black 1974). In their work, Fischer (1995) and Black 
(1974) refer to a number of empirical studies that support the assumption that larger 
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municipalities are more diverse than smaller municipalities. Although those studies 
only analyze the situation in the United States, there is no reason to believe that these 
ideas are not relevant in the Norwegian context as well. 
3.2 Size, diversity and political conflict 
In this section, we attempt to demonstrate that it is plausible that a municipality’s size 
and diversity are connected to the level of political conflict within a municipality. In 
order to do this, we try to identify the most important mechanism that transforms 
diversity and size into political conflict. We assume here that the size of a 
municipality is connected with the level of political conflict in two ways: On one 
hand, is it reasonable to assume that there is a direct connection between size and the 
level of political conflict; the larger a municipality, the larger the political conflict. 
On the other hand, do we assume that municipality size has an indirect effect on the 
level of political conflict via the degree of diversity within the municipality; the 
larger a municipality, the more diverse is the municipality, which again results in a 
higher level of political conflict. Figure 3.1 illustrates the relationship between these 
three variables. 
 
Municipality 
size 
Political 
conflict 
Degree of 
diversity + + 
+ 
Figure 3.1: The relationship between size, diversity, and political conflict 
It is important to point out that size and diversity are assumed to have an independent 
effect on the level of conflict within a municipality; diversity is in this model not only 
a substitute measure for size. At the same time is it clear that we expect the level of 
diversity to be positively correlated with the size of a municipality. However, does 
correlation not mean that size determines the level of diversity. It is, for instance, 
reasonable to assume that two municipalities of identical sizes have different levels of 
diversity. In this case, we would expect that the municipality, which is more diverse, 
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to have a higher level of conflict. Let us now take a closer look on the mechanisms 
that are assumed to transform size and diversity into political conflict.  
3.2.1 Diversity and political conflict 
Our assumption with regard to the relationship between diversity and conflict is that 
municipalities that are more diverse are characterized by a higher level of political 
conflict. In the introductory chapter, we defined political conflict as disagreement 
around the outcome of political processes. Diversity is, on the other hand, a function 
of the number of politically relevant subgroups within a municipality and their 
relative size. We expect the members of the same subgroup to share the same interest 
with regard to the outcome of local political processes. Here, especially the provision 
of different municipal services is important. Because of this, we assume that each 
group has distinct demands toward local political decision-makers, and the more 
groups there are in a municipality, the larger is the amount of distinct demands that 
local politicians achieve from the residents in a municipality. 
An usual assumption with regard to proportional election systems, where the voter 
casts its vote for a party list (and not a single candidate), is that the parties compete 
with each other by their election programs; the parties are assumed to produce an 
election program, which maximizes the number of voters (within the ideological 
range of the party). The individual voter is assumed to vote for the party that has the 
election program, which is most in accordance with the voters’ self-interest. This 
result logically from our supposition that individuals act rational: a rational individual 
tries to achieve some benefits by participating in politics, and this benefit is at least 
the implementation of a policy, which is in accordance with the participants’ self-
interest. The result of this is that the structure of the group conflict in a municipality 
directly transfers into the party system. The character of the party competition within 
the municipal council is therefore a good indicator of the political conflict within a 
municipality. On the other side, we can object to this argumentation that the electoral 
system in Norwegian municipalities also have elements of a personal election. The 
residents are able to strike out individual candidates from the party lists, and replace 
them by another candidate on the ballot paper. Data from the “Size and local 
democracy in Norway”-survey shows that about one third of the population in 
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Norway use this kind of personal votes. However, despite these findings we can say 
that the election of party lists is still the most important element at a municipal 
election. Therefore, the logic of our argumentation is still relevant here. 
A precondition for this assumption is, of course, that the citizens of a municipality 
perceive the municipal council as to be able to settle a conflict. This requires that the 
parties within the municipal council have the power and the authority to implement 
the preferences of the population. Of course, it is arguable whether this precondition 
is fulfilled or not, but it is certainly not completely unrealistic. 
Do members of the same group really have common interests? 
It seems that it is a rather strong simplification of reality to claim that members of the 
same group have common interests. We can also formulate this in another way and 
say that persons that share the same background variables have common interests. Is 
this a simplification of reality that is too strong, and what conceptions would be the 
alternative to this view? In the following, we will shortly discuss the drawbacks of 
this conception, outline some alternatives and see whether it is possible to use these 
alternatives in the framework of this analysis. 
The main objection concerns the assumption that members of the same group share 
the same interests, which means that all members of the same group have the same 
party preference at local elections. A discussion of this assumption must, of course, 
also consider the number of manifest cleavage lines within a municipality. We will 
discuss that in a second, but for now, we assume that there is only one cleavage line 
that separates the groups in a municipality. In this special case, it is easy for the single 
group member to define her attachment to a group and therefore is the declared 
relationship between group structure and political conflict realistic. On the other side, 
even in the case of one cleavage, there might be some difficulties for one person to 
identify its group attachment. 
Let us illustrate this point with an imaginable municipality, where only one 
cleavage separates the municipality with regard to age. Younger residents, in this 
municipality, might be in favour of investing more money into public nurseries and 
elementary schools, while the older residents are more interested in social services for 
the elderly. From the theoretical framework that we present here follows that the 
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elderly vote for a party that promises to prefer services for the elderly above services 
for children. The younger residents, on the other side, are expected to vote for a party 
that promise the opposite. However, is this a reasonable assumption? At this place, it 
can be relevant to introduce two different conceptions of self-interest: “objective self-
interest” and “subjective self-interest” (Johansen 1996). The conception used in this 
work is that of an “objective self-interest”. This means that we ascribe persons with 
the same social background the same self-interest. The ascription of self-interest is 
purely based on objective criteria and therefore labelled “objective self-interest”. An 
example for this is that we assume that all elderly persons are interested in municipal 
services like homes for the elderly or the like. This ascription of interests is purely 
based on the fact that all those people are at the same age; we do not consider other 
factors. The problem with this conception is that there is no place for individual 
variation. A single background variable is simply not enough to describe a person’s 
situation of life. Not every younger resident, with a specific age, has children, and not 
every family with children is dependent on municipal services like nursery schools. 
In addition, a young family might share their home with the elder generation. In this 
way, the members of the young family are not only concerned about municipal 
services for children, but also about municipal services for seniors (Johansen 1996: 
12). 
There seems to be two solutions for this problem: First, we can use a combination 
of several socioeconomic background variables to express an individual’s self-
interest. Within this approach, we could combine variables like age, number of 
persons living in the household, marital status and the like in order to achieve a more 
precise definition of a person’s “objective self-interest”. Unfortunately, there are 
several disadvantages with this approach. Again, there is the problem of individual 
variation, which is not resolved completely by considering a larger number of 
background variables. Some relevant variables will always be excluded from the 
analysis. Another problem is that this approach necessarily will result in a large 
number of subgroups, and that the model of analysis becomes very complex. If we 
consider two variables as relevant, each with two categories, the population will be 
separated into four groups. Adding a third variable, which has three categories, 
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increases the number of possible combinations to twelve, and so on. Therefore, a 
second solution seems to be better. This solution is based on what Johansen calls for 
“subjective self-interest” (Johansen 1996: 14). According to this idea, the self-interest 
should not be based on objective criteria, such as background variables, but on 
subjective ones, such as direct measures of self-interest. However, data of this kind 
are not available from our empiric material. Since it seems that we do not have a 
reasonable solution to this problem, we have necessarily to accept the concept of 
“objective self-interest”. Nevertheless, the shortcomings of this approach should be 
clear now. An argument in favour of using a conception of “objective self-interest”, is 
that it is an usual method of analyzing the relationship between the group conflict and 
the party systems in national politics (for an example see Knutsen 1989). 
However, even when we accept the idea of “objective self-interest”, it is unclear 
what a person’s self-interest is in the case of several cleavages within a municipality. 
Several subgroups along different cleavage lines might be politically relevant within 
a municipality, and a resident might be member of more than only one group. Two 
situations are possible in this context: the cleavages might be overlapping or 
crosscutting. Overlapping cleavages means that the cleavage lines of several 
cleavages separates the population in identical groups. The lines were identical, or 
overlapping. A municipality with crosscutting cleavages, on the other hand, is 
characterized by a situation where the different cleavage lines separate the population 
in different groups. The cleavage lines are crossing each other. 
In the case that the cleavage lines are overlapping, the residents in a municipality 
might not have any problem to identify the party that represents their interest best. On 
the other hand, when the cleavage lines are crosscutting, the members of several 
groups must decide which group attachment (and which self-interest) is the most 
important when voting for a party. Since a decision to vote for one party in the case 
of crosscutting cleavages means preferring one group attachment, while betraying the 
interests of the other groups, a person might experience crosscutting cleavages as 
unpleasant, and might avoid the critical decision between various group attachments 
by not voting at all. 
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Let us illustrate this by another imaginable municipality. In this municipality, two 
cleavages are politically important. These two are age (which we already have 
presented) and the division between religious and secular residents. In the case of 
overlapping cleavages, both cleavages divide the population into only two groups. 
The younger residents are more secular, while the older residents are more religiously 
active. Therefore when voting, nobody has to decide which interest (or group 
attachment) is the most important. The younger residents can vote for a party that has 
a secular program and gives municipal services for the younger population top 
priority. The older residents, on the other hand, are likely to find another party that is 
in agreement with their preferences, which means that the party is religious and 
supports municipal services for the elderly. Nevertheless, there might also appear a 
situation where these cleavage lines cross each others, dividing the municipality in 
more than only two groups. The younger residents might be partly religious and 
partly secular, and the same might be true for the older residents. In this case, the 
residents have to decide which interest is the most important one, when casting a 
vote; shall younger residents that are religious vote for a party that supports religious 
values or for a party that prefers municipal services for children above services for 
the elderly.  
The problem for our theoretical framework is that, in a situation with crosscutting 
cleavages, it is not possible to deduce the preference for a certain party from a 
person’s group attachment unambiguously. We should in addition have information 
about the importance of a number of group attachments for an individual, before a 
relation between a person’s group attachment and a person’s party preference can be 
made. The only solution for this problem is, in my opinion, again to use the 
conception of “subjective self-interest”. However, this is, as we already have 
mentioned, not possible in this work. Therefore, the possible existence of mutual and 
crosscutting cleavages are another factor that limits the usefulness of the approach 
chosen here. 
Relevant cleavages in Norwegian municipalities 
We have also to consider which politically relevant (or manifest) cleavage lines we 
can expect to exist in Norwegian municipalities. In an attempt to outline a space of 
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local political conflicts, Skare (2000) applies two dimensions: the character of a 
conflict – national or local; and the substance of a conflict – sector priority or other 
activity. 
 
Figure 3.2: The space of local political conflicts as a function of two dimensions 
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Kilde: Skare (2000: 91; Figure 7) 
The differentiation with regard to the character of a conflict should be clear. Some 
cleavages within a municipality are clearly related to local issues, such as localization 
issues with regard to public buildings or the allocation of resources between the 
various municipal services. On the other side, there are some conflicts, which are the 
result of national cleavages. Here we can think of conflict issues like the privatization 
of municipal services or regulations concerning the sale of alcohol. However, not all 
national cleavages are important in this respect. Generally, four cleavages are 
supposed to be relevant in Norwegian national politics. In his empirical analysis of 
the Norwegian national party space, Knutsen (1989) shows that these four conflicts 
were a left-right dimension, a religious dimension separating religious activists from 
secular persons, a centre-periphery conflict, and a materialism-postmaterialism 
conflict. All of these cleavages can be assumed politically relevant in municipal 
politics as well, with the exception of the centre-periphery conflict. This conflict is 
more likely to polarise the population in municipalities in more central areas of 
Norway against the population in municipalities that are located more peripheral, and 
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constitutes therefore not a cleavage within a municipality. More recently, Knutsen 
(2001) finds support for the assumption that the importance of the classical left-right 
dimension weakens at the expense of new cleavages. Most important in this 
connection is a gender cleavage and a sector employment cleavage. Of these two 
“new” cleavages, it is only the sector employment conflict that can be assumed to be 
relevant within the framework of this analysis, since the gender distribution of 
municipalities probably not varies significantly. In sum, according to the empirical 
findings of Knutsen, four national cleavages can be assumed to be relevant in 
municipal politics as well. These four are: a left-right dimension (also called social 
class cleavage), a religious cleavage, a sector employment cleavage, and a 
materialism-postmaterialism cleavage. 
The cleavages that are truly local cleavages are discussed in the following with 
regard to the second dimension of local political conflict, the substance of a conflict. 
Skare refers here to a differentiation introduced by Sørensen (1989). The term sector 
priority refers to the municipal task of allocating resources between the various 
municipal services, which range from public transportation, and cultural facilities to 
care for the elderly and services for the youngest. By other activity, Sørensen refers to 
municipal tasks like planning, organizational development and general administrative 
issues. 
Of these municipal tasks, sector priority seems to be the most important within the 
context of this work, since it can be assumed that the issue of allocating resources 
between the various municipal services is very disputed and visible. This makes 
sector priority, in turn, a relevant factor when the individual voter has to decide which 
party to vote at local elections. In my opinion, the most important conflict arising 
from sector priority concerns the allocation of resources between services for children 
and young people against services for the elder generation. In this respect, the size of 
age groups within a municipality might be a relevant cleavage line (demographic 
cleavage). In addition, the family structure might also be important (family cleavage). 
Here, we should consider factors like the proportion of families that have children 
living at home or the share of single parents. In addition, there might be another 
conflict arising with regard to the allocation of resources between individual services, 
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Table 3.1: Seven relevant cleavage lines in the Norwegian local politics, divided 
by the character of the conflict 
Social class cleavage 
Religious cleavage 
Sector employment cleavage 
National conflicts with 
relevance in local politics 
Materialism-postmaterialism cleavage 
Demographic cleavage 
Family cleavage Purely local conflicts 
Income cleavage 
 
such as nursery schools or home help, and collective services, such as cultural and 
sport facilities. This kind of cleavage might separate households with a larger income 
from those that have a smaller income (income cleavage). Residents with a higher 
income might be willing to pay for their own individual services, while they rather 
are interested in a higher municipal expense level for collective services. Table 3.1 
summarizes the discussion about which cleavages might be relevant in local politics 
in Norway. 
3.2.2 Size and political conflict 
There are two reasons to expect that the size of a municipality affects the level of 
political conflict within a municipality. For the first, we can assume that, all other 
factors being equal (especially the number of subgroups within a municipality), the 
subgroups have a higher number of members in larger municipalities than in smaller 
ones. This might affect the level of conflict because a larger group is likely to have a 
larger amount of resources – human and material – at their disposition. These 
resources can be used to make political disagreements more visible, by PR-campaigns 
or by political actions such as demonstrations or strikes. However, they can also be 
used to mobilize other residents. As a result, a larger subgroup might exert more 
pressure to the political decision-taker. 
A second reason in favour of a positive relationship between size and political 
conflict is that there is more at stake in larger cities than in smaller towns. Larger 
municipalities are generally assumed more capable to implement the preferences of 
their residents, and therefore, political conflicts become more significant for the 
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actual political outcome. This might increase the level of political conflict as well. 
Dahl & Tufte (1973) refer to this as a municipality’s system capacity. 
3.2.3 The determinants of political conflict – a summary 
Let us now, shortly, sum up the discussion of how municipality size and diversity 
influence the level of political conflict. With regard to the level of diversity, we use a 
conception of “objective self-interest” to describe how a municipality’s group 
structure can be transformed into the party competition within a municipal council. 
The group structure is described as a system of cleavages, and we identified seven 
cleavage lines that are supposed to be relevant in the Norwegian context. Turning to 
the size of a municipality, we argued for two factors that connect municipality size 
with the level of political conflict: the amount of resources available and the fact that 
there is more at stake in larger municipalities. 
We presented these arguments in order to explain an increased party competition 
in the municipal council of larger municipalities. This is only done because party 
competition is the conceptualization of political conflict in this work. However, it is 
clear that a disagreement around political outcomes in local politics also might take 
other forms in other political arenas. The arguments presented above are certainly 
also relevant to explain other phenomena such as the frequency and intensity of 
political discussions or the amount of disagreements in nomination processes. 
3.3 Political participation and its determinants 
In the previous section, we presented a number of arguments that make it likely to 
assume that the level of conflict within a municipality is dependent on the 
municipality’s size and diversity. The underlying assumption is that size and diversity 
determines the structure of subgroups within a municipality. Therefore, we take the 
group structure as a starting point and try to demonstrate how different kinds of group 
structure result in different levels of political conflict, which again lead to distinct 
levels of participation. However, before we continue with that task, we look on Dahl 
& Tufte’s (1973) assumption with regard to the relationship between size and 
participation. 
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3.3.1 Dahl & Tufte’s assumption concerning size and participation 
Dahl & Tufte (1973) draw an ambiguous picture of the relationship between size and 
participation. On one hand, they claim that the citizen’s sense of effectiveness is an 
important factor that varies with the size of a municipality. By sense of effectiveness 
they mean “[...] the chance, in the citizen’s view, that his action will make a 
significant difference in the outcome, that is, that he will be effective” (Dahl & Tufte 
1973: 41). The larger the sense of effectiveness the higher is the incentive to 
participate in politics, other things being equal. A usual assumption with regard to the 
relationship between size and sense of effectiveness is that citizens in smaller 
municipalities feel more effective and that this feeling of effectiveness becomes 
weaker with increasing size of the political unit. Consequently, the level of 
participation is assumed to decrease with increasing municipality size. 
However, on the other hand, Dahl & Tufte point towards another possible 
connection between size and participation. In their opinion, a second mechanism 
should be considered, which might result in a positive relationship between size and 
participation; this means that participation might be more likely in larger 
municipalities than in smaller ones. This line of thinking takes the diversity of a 
municipality as the starting point and is therefore more relevant here. The most 
important arguments from this part of Dahl & Tufte’s work are summarized in the 
following. 
In short, they claim that 
“[i]f increasing numbers seem to dilute the effectiveness of the average 
citizen, there is one way in which increasing numbers work to enhance 
his effectiveness: by increasing the chances of finding an ally.” (Dahl & 
Tufte 1974: 90) 
Their arguments build on an assumption that we presented earlier: the supposition 
that a group of residents with the same interests needs to be of a certain size, achieve 
a critical mass, in order to, as Dahl & Tufte puts it, communicate, organize, and 
express its dissent to the majority view. They argue that (irrespective of the character 
of the minimum threshold, either an absolute or a relative size) it is always more 
likely that residents with a minority view become organized in larger municipalities 
than in smaller ones. In addition, are larger municipalities more likely to be more 
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diverse, which mean that there are a larger number of organizations in larger 
municipalities. This increases the possibility for the organized interests to create 
coalitions in order to pursuit mutual benefits. The size of a municipality is therefore 
not only positively related to the “[…] chance that a dissenter find enough allies to 
pass the threshold for dissent”, but also to “[…] the likelihood of persistent and overt 
opposition to majority views […]” (ibid.: 91). 
A consequence of the increased possibility to create a stable opposition in larger 
municipalities is that the level of political conflict increases. 
“The small system, being more homogeneous, is […] likely to be more 
consensual; the larger system, being more heterogeneous, is […] likely 
to be more conflictual.” (ibid.: 91) 
However, this picture has to be differentiated. Larger municipalities might be more 
conflictual, but the character of political conflict might vary between smaller and 
larger municipalities. In smaller municipalities, open conflicts are less frequent, but 
when a conflict first appears, it is likely to be more intense. The reason for this is that 
it is likely that everybody knows each other and each other’s opinion on a specific 
issue in smaller municipalities. In addition, is it not possible for residents in smaller 
municipalities to hide in anonymity, which is possible in larger municipalities. 
Therefore, the residents are forced to take a side in a conflict. Because of this, conflict 
in smaller municipalities involves the whole municipality, and may have elements of 
personal conflict among individuals in the group. Dahl & Tufte formulated this point 
like this: 
“The small, homogeneous system is simply less “groupy”; group 
loyalties are correspondingly weaker, whereas overall solidarity is 
greater. Hence if group conflict is to be pressed, the stakes, both 
personal and collective, need to be relatively higher in the small system 
than in the large one.” (ibid.: 93) 
Since group conflict in larger municipalities is more frequent and less costly for the 
individual, the “advantages of permanent, organized institutions for dealing with 
conflict are more obvious; hence group conflicts are likely to take on institutionalized 
forms” (ibid.: 94). Therefore, political conflict is not only more frequent in larger 
municipalities, it is also easier to observe because the conflict is institutionalized. 
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This again supports our assumption that the party competition is stronger in larger 
municipalities than in smaller ones. 
However, there is another factor, which makes a positive relationship between size 
and participation more likely. Dahl & Tufte described two criteria, which should be 
satisfied by an ideal polity. Besides the possibility of the residents in a municipality 
to affect political decisions (this criteria was called citizen effectiveness), is it also 
important that a municipality has the possibility to implement the preferences of its 
citizens politically. This criteria was called system capacity (ibid.: 20). Generally, it is 
assumed that larger municipalities are more effective, and are probably more capable 
to transform the preferences of their residents into political decisions without 
interference from outside. Reasons for this might, for instance, be that larger 
municipalities have the advantage of a large scale production and may attract 
specialized working force more easily. 
Both arguments presented here (the likelihood of finding an ally and system 
capacity) lead to the conclusion that the likelihood of participation is higher in larger 
municipalities than it is in smaller places. However, the different argumentations are 
relevant for different groups of residents. The argument concerning a municipality’s 
system capacity, on one hand, predicts that participation in general is higher in larger 
municipalities because the residents acknowledge that their participation really 
matters (to a larger degree as residents in smaller municipalities). On the other hand, 
is the argument concerning the likelihood of finding an ally only relevant for persons 
that have a minority view. In larger municipalities these persons perceive that they 
can exert pressure on the political decision-takers collectively, which increases the 
chance of getting a benefit from the participatory act. Therefore, minorities will 
participate to a larger extent in larger municipalities. 
In sum, Dahl & Tufte draw an ambiguous picture of the relationship between size 
and participation. According to the argumentation with regard to the citizens feeling 
of effectiveness, the conditions for participation are better in smaller municipalities. 
On the other hand, however, there are other reasons that support an assumption that 
participation is higher in larger municipalities. Perhaps the ideal size of a 
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municipality with regard to the general level of participation is not at the extreme 
point of the size scale, but somewhere in between? 
In the light of Dahl & Tufte’s numerous and ambiguous arguments with regard to 
the relationship between size and participation, this work attempts to test one possible 
connection between size and participation, while controlling for other possible 
factors. Therefore, we try to test the assumption concerning the relationship between 
size, conflict and participation, while we control for the effects of the residents 
feeling of political efficacy. 
3.3.2 Size, conflict and participation 
Dahl & Tufte are not the only political scientists that assume that conflict mobilizes 
individuals to participate in political activities (Deutsch 1961). Moreover, a number 
of empirical studies support the assumption that the level of political participation is 
higher in political units that are diverse, while less diverse political systems generally 
are characterized by a lower level of political participation (Oliver1999, Weber 
2000). In these studies, the authors hypothesize that the relationship between 
diversity and participation is mediated by political conflict (or competition): the more 
diverse a political unit, the higher is the level of political conflict, and, in turn, the 
more likely is political participation. Unfortunately, neither Deutsch nor Oliver or 
Weber give a theoretical argumentation for why political conflict mobilizes people to 
participate in politics. Therefore, the main objective in this section is it to 
demonstrate the validity of the assumption that conflict has a mobilizing effect. 
Our starting point is that a municipality’s size and level of diversity determines the 
structure of subgroups within the municipality. The larger a municipality, the larger 
are the subgroups in absolute terms, given that all other factors are constant (and here 
especially the number of subgroups). However, at the same time, we expect the size 
of a municipality to be positively related to the level of diversity. Moreover, diversity 
has, as we already have pointed out, three dimensions: the number of cleavages in a 
municipality, the number of subgroups along a cleavage line and the relative size of 
the subgroups. Of course, the relationship between size and diversity is not 
deterministic but rather probabilistic, in such a way that not every increase in the size 
of a municipality always leads to an increased diversity. It is only probable, to a 
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certain degree that a larger municipality is more diverse as well. Therefore, it makes 
sense to introduce size, and more concrete the absolute size of the subgroups, as an 
own characteristic of the structure of subgroups within a municipality. Figure 3.3 
illustrates this relationship. 
 
Figure 3.3: The relationship between size and diversity, the structure of 
subgroups, and the structure of political conflict within a municipality 
 
Municipality 
size 
Level of 
diversity 
Number of subgroups 
Number of 
cleavage lines 
Number of 
subgroups along 
the cleavage lines 
Relative size of 
subgroups 
Absolute size of 
subgroups 
Number of conflicts 
in a municipality 
Intensity of conflicts 
in a municipality 
The structure of subgroups within a 
municipality 
The conflict 
structure 
Features of the 
municipality 
As Figure 3.3 shows, we can say that the general level of political conflict is a 
function of the number of conflicts within a municipality, and the intensity of the 
conflicts. When we consider how the group structure of a municipality affects the 
level of conflict, we can see from the figure that the number of conflicts is dependent 
on the number of manifest cleavage lines within a municipality. The intensity of the 
conflicts within a municipality, on the other side, is determined by the remaining 
three aspects of the group structure: the absolute size of the subgroups, the relative 
size of the subgroups and the number of subgroups along the cleavage lines. Despite 
the fact that we treat the four aspects of the group structure mainly as isolated effects, 
it is clear that they are interrelated with each other. Therefore the observations that 
we make in this section are only valid under the ceteris paribus assumption, which 
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means that we assume that all other factors are equal. In the following, we elaborate 
how the group structure affects the conflict structure in a municipality, and how this, 
in turn can be assumed to affect the likelihood of participation. 
3.3.3 The number of conflicts within a municipality 
With regard to the number of conflicts within a municipality, it is difficult to make 
any general assumptions about the effect of the number of conflicts on level of 
participation. The crucial question, which has to be clarified first, is whether the 
underlying cleavage lines in a municipality are crosscutting or overlapping. These 
features of the cleavage structure have we already discussed earlier. In a situation 
with crosscutting cleavages, each subgroup in a municipality is again divided by 
another active conflict line. This leads to a situation where it is difficult for the 
residents to make up their minds about which cleavage line is the most important, and 
on which side of the multiple conflicts they should engage in politics. It is therefore 
likely that the residents will not participate in politics at all. The more crosscutting 
cleavages there are in a municipality, the higher is the level of conflict because more 
cleavage lines imply a larger disagreement around the outcome of the political 
process. Therefore, in this situation an increased level of political conflict might 
result in a lower likelihood of participation. 
On the other hand, in municipalities that are characterized by overlapping 
cleavages, we can expect the level of political participation to increase when the 
number of manifest cleavage lines grows, because the conflict embraces more than 
just one cleavage line. The contrast between the subgroups that are standing against 
each other is deepened, and the population has no problem to identify their group 
attachment and on which side of the conflict they stand. In this case, an increase in 
the level of conflict (which implies an increase in the number of cleavage lines) 
results in a higher likelihood of participation. 
In reality, however, the situation with regard to the structure of cleavage lines 
within a municipality is more complex than described here. It is most likely that we 
will find a combination of crosscutting and overlapping cleavage lines, which makes 
it difficult to predict the outcome of an increase in the number of cleavage lines with 
regard to the level of participation. In addition, does our empirical material not allow 
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a measurement of the relationship between the different cleavage lines. This would 
require the measurement of the cleavage lines on the individual level, and not, as we 
conceptualize diversity, as a variable on the structural level. Therefore, the 
relationship between the number of cleavage lines and the level of participation is not 
considered further in the empirical analysis. 
3.3.4 The intensity of the conflict 
When the number of the cleavage lines is constant within a municipality, the level of 
conflict may increase because the conflict’s intensity gets larger. With intensity of a 
conflict, we mean the strength of a disagreement around political issues. Of course, a 
conflict is more intense when more people are engaged in the quarrel. In this way, an 
increased intensity of a conflict implies a higher level of participation. However, the 
intensity of a conflict can also refer to situations where strong feelings were involved 
or where strong parts are standing against each other. In this situation, an increased 
intensity of a conflict implies not automatically a higher level of participation. As 
already mentioned, the intensity of a conflict within a municipality is thought of as a 
function of three features of the group structure: the absolute size of the subgroups, 
the relative size of the subgroups and the number of subgroups along the individual 
cleavage lines. 
The absolute size of groups within a municipality 
When a municipality gets larger, we assume that the subgroups within the 
municipality increase in absolute size – given that the relative size of the subgroups 
remains the same. Previously, we described two main mechanisms that tie the 
absolute group size together with the intensity of a conflict: the resources available 
for the groups and the importance of the outcome of the conflict for the residents 
(system capacity). A higher amount of resources means that the subgroups can make 
the conflict more visible in the municipality. They are therefore able to mobilize 
passive members to take a stand and to participate in politics. With regard to the 
second mechanism – related to system capacity – it seems to be likely that the 
residents in municipalities with larger absolute subgroups might be willing to be 
mobilized, because they think that the participation makes a difference. The attempts 
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to recruit residents are therefore more likely to be successful in larger municipalities 
than in smaller ones. Therefore, we can assume that the likelihood for political 
participation is higher in municipalities that have larger subgroups (absolutely) than 
in municipalities with smaller subgroups.  
The number of groups along a cleavage and their relative size 
All other things being equal, we can expect that a larger number of groups along a 
cleavage line results in a higher level of conflict. There are more interests to consider 
in the process of political decision taking; ergo the disagreement around political 
issues is higher. However, the number of groups along a cleavage is probably only 
affecting the level of conflict marginally compared to the changes one can expect 
when the relative sizes of the subgroups change. In the case when there is only one 
large subgroup along a cleavage line which dominates over a larger number of other 
small subgroups, then the level of conflict can be expected to be rather low; even 
when the total number of subgroups is quite high. The dominating group is in this 
situation able to suppress every conflict from the beginning. One or two additional 
groups in this scenario will increase the level of conflict, but not to the same extent as 
when the sizes of the groups change (for instance that the dominating group becomes 
smaller and the other groups larger). On the other hand, in a situation where all 
subgroups along a cleavage line are approximately of the same size, we expect the 
level of conflict to be highest. However, also in this situation an increase in the 
number of groups will only increase the conflict to a much smaller extent. Therefore, 
to understand the level of political participation in a municipality it is much more 
important to consider the relative sizes of the subgroups along a cleavage line than 
the number of subgroups. 
The crucial question is it now whether it is likely to suppose that the level of 
participation is higher when the subgroups along a cleavage line are of approximately 
the same size. In this context, two mechanisms seems to be relevant. One mechanism 
is an individual one, derived from rational calculations of the residents. The other is a 
mechanism of mobilization (or recruitment), which emanates mainly from the leaders 
of the respective groups. 
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Let us look at the individual mechanism first. We assume, that the individual 
members of a subgroup within a municipality share the same interests, and that these 
interests are the motive for participation. Therefore, in a situation where all the 
subgroups in a municipality are of approximately the same size, the participation of 
one individual person can be decisive, in a way that the group that represents the 
person’s interest achieves a majority position. This logic is suitable for many forms of 
political participation. In the case of participation in local elections, one vote can be 
the vote that brings a party or local list into a situation of relative or absolute 
majority. In addition, for contacting local politicians or local party organizations, this 
logic is relevant as well. When, for instance, a politician or a party try to identify their 
standpoint in a political conflict, and the outcome is expected to be close, a letter or 
telephone call from only a few citizens might be decisive for the manifestation of the 
parties or politicians policy. Therefore, we can expect the likelihood of participation 
to be higher in situations where the subgroups in a municipality are of the same size. 
The preconditions for this prediction are that about the same share of members in 
every subgroup participate, and that the citizens in a municipality perceive the 
situation as being close. 
The second mechanism is of a collective nature. This mechanism has its origin 
mainly in the leaders of the respective subgroups. In a situation where the subgroups 
in a municipality are of the same size, it is important becomes crucial for the various 
subgroups to mobilize as many members of the group as possible. In addition, as we 
have argued before, is a situation where political decisions hang in the balance the 
right moment to mobilize the residents in a municipality. The reason for this is that 
recruitment in this situation is more successful, just and simple because of what we 
have discussed above: the individual participants perceive the probability to make a 
difference when participating as quite high. 
Nevertheless, the attempt to mobilize group members does not necessarily have to 
come from the leaders of a group. It is also possible that the ordinary members start 
the mobilization process from the bottom, for instance by organizing a petition or by 
starting a local action group.  
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An additional reason for an increased level of participation can be found in the 
competition between the groups in a situation where all groups are of the same size. 
The attempt of one group to mobilize its members will probably trigger other 
subgroups to attempt to mobilize members as well. This interaction is therefore likely 
to reinforce the mobilization process and lead to a high level of participation. 
Therefore, we can conclude that the level of participation is high in municipalities 
that are divided into subgroups along a cleavage line that are of the same size. 
However, we can think of several other scenarios where the subgroups are not of the 
same size. Is it reasonable to assume that the level of participation will be lower in all 
these other cases? 
First, we can think of a situation where there is one larger subgroup, which 
embraces around half of the population in a municipality, and a number of smaller 
subgroups. In this situation, it is quite clear that the first mechanism which we 
outlined previously (the individuals’ rational calculation) will result in a higher level 
of participation. The member of the largest subgroup is likely to perceive that there is 
a large probability that his or her participation will give the largest subgroup the 
absolute majority, and that it is quite likely that the participation will make a 
difference for whether the preferred outcome will be realized or not. However, on the 
other side, the members of the smaller subgroups might not participate in politics 
because they realize that the interest of the largest subgroup will be implemented 
anyway. Therefore, in this situation, the participation will not be as high as in a 
situation with competition between groups. 
We have another situation when there is one large subgroup, which embraces a 
great majority of the population, and several other small subgroups. In this situation, 
the large subgroup does not need to mobilize its members, and the individual group 
members might feel that participation is not necessary in order to get its preferences 
fulfilled. It is quite certain that the large subgroup will get a majority position, 
irrespective of what the single group member does. Therefore, it seems reasonable 
that there will be a lower level of participation also in this situation. 
Finally, we can think of a situation where there are two or more larger subgroups, 
which are of the same size, and several other small groups. In this situation, we have 
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a similar condition as if all groups would have been of same size. The individual 
group members of the larger groups would feel that their participation might be 
decisive for their group to get a relative majority. At the same time are the groups in 
competition, which might reinforce participation by a mobilization process. Still, we 
can assume that the general level of participation will be lower in this situation, than 
in a situation where all groups are of the same size. This is a reasonable assumption 
because the mobilization process does not embrace the whole population of the 
municipality, but only the members of the larger subgroups, which compete with each 
other. 
Therefore, my conclusion is that the combination of an individual rational 
calculation and a collective mobilization process results in the highest level of 
participation in a situation where all groups in a municipality are of the same size. As 
illustrated, do other potential situations probably not lead to a higher level of 
participation. 
3.3.5 The determinants of political participation – a summary 
In this section, we tried to analyze the relationship between the size and diversity of a 
municipality and the level of participation by focusing on the characteristics of the 
group structure within a municipality. Municipalities that are more diverse are 
assumed to be characterized by at least one of these features: they have a large 
number of manifest cleavage lines, they have a larger number of subgroups along the 
individual cleavage lines, or the subgroups along the cleavage lines approach each 
other in size. The absolute size of the subgroups along a cleavage line (which means 
the number of members) expresses changes in the size of a municipality. All these 
features of the group structure affect the level of political conflict positively. In all 
cases, the disagreement around political decisions is likely to be greater than in 
municipalities that are smaller or less diverse. The group structure affects the political 
conflict in two different ways: the number of cleavages in a municipality is assumed 
to affect the disagreement around political decisions by influencing the number of 
potential conflict issues, while the other three features of the group structure rather 
affect the intensity of the conflict along a particular cleavage. 
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The consequences for the level of political participation are uncertain. The number 
of political conflicts has an ambiguous effect on the level of participation. Dependent 
of the relationship between the various cleavages – whether they are overlapping or 
crosscutting – the level of participation can be thought of as getting higher or lower 
the more cleavages there are in a municipality. The intensity of the conflicts, on the 
other hand, is likely to increase the level of participation. 
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4. Conceptualization of variables 
After having concluded our theoretical discussion in the previous chapter, we turn 
now to the question of how to measure the variables that we presented there. In 
Chapter 3, we drew a quite complex picture of the structure of subgroups and 
conflicts, and their relationship to the level of participation, and it should be obvious 
that it is difficult to reproduce these patterns empirically. Because of the nature of our 
empirical material, we have to limit the scope of our empirical analysis with regard to 
the theoretical model. Especially the conceptualization of diversity and political 
conflict has been difficult. In the following, we will therefore present in which way 
we attempt to measure the various theoretical variables, and evaluate the 
consequences for the empirical testing of our theoretical model. 
As already mentioned, we use data from two sources: data from “The Commune 
Database” are used to measure structural (or macro level) variables, which describe 
the context of participation in a municipality. Data from the “Size and local 
democracy in Norway”-survey, on the other hand, are used to measure individual (or 
micro level) variables, which describe the attributes of the individual residents within 
a municipality. We separate therefore the presentation of the conceptualization of the 
various variables into to parts, according to the source of data. First, we discuss the 
measurement of the structural data and thereafter the measurement of the variables on 
the individual level of analysis. 
4.1 The structural level variables 
On this level of analysis, three sets of variables will be measured: municipality size, 
the municipalities’ level of diversity, and the degree of political conflict within a 
municipality. 
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4.1.1 Municipality size 
The size of a municipality is conceptualized as the lognormal distribution4 of the 
number of residents at 01. January 2001. This variable is transformed by a logarithm 
because it seems reasonable to assume that a given difference in size has a larger 
effect on the level of political conflict for smaller municipalities than for larger ones. 
Behind the use of a linear size scale lies the assumption that a given change in the 
number of residence always has the same effect on the level of conflict irrespective of 
the size of the municipality. However, it is not hard to believe that a given difference 
of, for instance, 10 000 residents might have a larger effect on the amount of conflict 
in smaller than in larger municipalities. When we, for instance, compare a 
municipality of 1000 residents with a municipality of 11 000 residents, we should 
expect the level of conflict to change more than when we compare a municipality of 
50 000 residents with a municipality that has 60 000 residents. By transforming the 
size scale logarithmically, we achieve this effect. A given difference in the number of 
residents places the municipalities farer away from each other at the lower end of the 
size scale, while the distance becomes smaller at the upper end of the size scale. A 
difference of 10 000 residents transforms into a distance of 1,04 on the logarithmic 
size scale when the size of a municipality increases from 1000 to 11 000. At the same 
time, this difference transforms into a distance of only 0,08 on the logarithmic size 
scale when the municipality size increases from 50 000 to 60 000 residents. 
Other arguments imply the use of a logarithmic size scale as well. Municipality 
size varies, per definition, between zero and infinite and has, in addition, a standard 
deviation that is much larger than the average size5. This is a consequence of the 
skewed distribution of the size variable, with many small municipalities and a few 
large municipalities, where the difference between the smallest and the largest 
municipality is enormous. For variables with this characteristic, a normal distribution 
is not appropriate because this would imply the existence of negative values, which 
per definition are not existent (Taagepera 1999). Therefore, a lognormal distribution 
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 With a lognormal distribution we mean a transformation by the logarithm at the base of ten 
5
 The average size of a municipality in Norway (pr. 01.01.2002) is 10 353, while the standard deviation is 29 680 
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transforms the skewed distributed size scale into a scale that can be assumed to be 
normally distributed, and that varies from minus infinite to plus infinite. 
Consequently, a lognormal transformed size scale complies better with the 
preconditions for a number of statistical methods of analysis (like the least square 
regression method) than a not transformed size scale does. 
4.1.2 The level of diversity 
The measurement of a municipality’s level of diversity requires special data. 
Diversity is, as we have outlined earlier, a function of the number of cleavage lines 
within a municipality, the number of the subgroups along these cleavage lines, and 
their relative size. Therefore, the data material should contain information that would 
make it possible to identify politically relevant cleavage lines, and that allow us, in 
addition, to locate the respondents along these cleavage lines. The data for this 
purpose have to be measured on the individual level. Unfortunately, our individual 
data do not give us this kind of information. 
Therefore, we apply a more restricted approach to the problem. With respect to the 
number of politically relevant cleavages in Norwegian municipalities, we take the 
cleavages presented in Table 3.1 and assume that all of these seven cleavages are 
politically relevant to the same degree. However, our data allow only the 
measurement of five cleavages: the social class cleavage, the religious cleavage, the 
demographic cleavage, the family cleavage, and the income cleavage. We drop 
therefore the sector cleavage and the materialism-postmaterialism cleavage from our 
analysis. 
We regard the number of subgroups along the cleavage lines as given. This means 
that the number of subgroups does not vary between the municipalities, but that we 
consider the same set of subgroups in each municipality. In some cases, such as the 
religious cleavage, the classification criteria of the population are rather obvious (for 
instance, members of state church, members of other denominations, and members of 
no religion). However, in other cases, such as the demographic cleavage that is 
measured on a continuous scale, the task of defining subgroups is more difficult. In 
these instances, a particular classification of the population into subgroups can have a 
significant effect on the measurement of diversity. Since we, in this context, lack a 
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theoretical justification for the classification of the population along the cleavage 
lines, we try to separate the population into subgroups that describes the distribution 
along that cleavage line as “objective” as possible. Therefore, we create a rather high 
number of subgroups that gives a rather detailed description of the distribution of the 
population along the cleavage line. 
Based on the five cleavage lines, and the subgroups that we identify along these 
lines (we will discuss this in the following), we attempt to measure the relative size of 
the subgroups. In this way, one measure of diversity for each cleavage line will be 
calculated (two for the family cleavage). These measures of diversity will be 
calculated for each municipality in Norway. 
In the following sections, we consider two problems with the measurement of 
diversity. The first problem is to decide which statistical measure to apply in order to 
measure the relative size of the subgroups along the cleavage lines; and the second 
problem relates to which data we should use to measure the different kinds of 
diversity. 
The measurement of diversity 
In the literature, we found two possible measurements of the level of diversity. Oliver 
(1999) applies an index of qualitative variation (IQV) to measure the degree of 
economic diversity in a number of American municipalities. This index compares the 
distribution of the population in a municipality with an ideal distribution in the case 
of total heterogeneity. It renders one when there is total heterogeneity (all groups in a 
municipality are of the same size) and zero when there is total homogeneity (all 
residents belong to the same group) (Oliver 1999: 188).6 
Another measurement of diversity is applied by Mouritzen (1989). In his attempt 
to measure class heterogeneity he compares the actual proportion of the population in 
three social classes with the proportions in the case of total heterogeneity (33,3% at 
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total heterogeneity, meaning that all three classes are of the same size). His measure 
of diversity is the sum of the absolute differences between the actual proportions and 
the ideal proportions (in the case of total heterogeneity). A high value on this measure 
indicates a lower degree of diversity and a lower measure indicates a high degree of 
diversity. A value of zero implies a situation of total heterogeneity, meaning that all 
groups are of the same size (Mouritzen 1989: 681f). In our statistical analysis, 
however, we will turn the scale of the diversity measure. Therefore implies a high 
value on the diversity measure a high degree of diversity and a low value on the 
measure implies a low degree of diversity. 
The conceptualization of Mouritzen seems to be the measure that is more 
appropriate for two reasons: first, there was convincing evidence that both of these 
conceptualizations of diversity measure approximately the same size. There appeared 
to be a high correlation between the IQV and Mouritzen’s diversity measure on all 
cleavage lines examined in this analysis7. And second, the conceptualization of 
Mouritzen is understood intuitively, while the IQV is based on a more complicated 
mathematical calculation. 
The data used to measure different kinds of diversity 
In order to measure the distribution of the residents within a municipality along the 
five cleavage lines we use data from different sources. These data have been collected 
at different points in time. Some data were collected recently, and we can therefore 
assume that they give an appropriate picture of the distribution of the population 
today, while other data were collected as far back as in 1980. In those cases, it must 
be evaluated how valid these data are to describe the characteristics of the population 
in the municipalities in the year 2001. Let us now consider the measures of diversity 
and evaluate the operational validity for each measure. 
An indicator of class diversity measures the distribution of the population along 
the social class cleavage. The data, which we use here, were from 1980 and they have 
been collected by Statistics Norway in their Census (Folke- og Boligtelling – FoB). 
                                            
7
 The correlations between this two measures varies between 0,949 and 0,995 (Pearson’s r) 
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The Census included all registered residents in Norway pr. November1, 1980. The 
basis for the calculation of the measure of class diversity is the classification of the 
population into occupational categories. On the background of this classification, the 
population was separated into three groups: persons working in the primary sector, 
persons working in the industrial sector, and persons working in the service sector. 
There are two comments with regard to the validity of this measurement of class 
diversity for our research problem. First, we have to notice the long period of time 
that lies between data collection and this analysis. Therefore, it might be reasonable 
to assume that the data do not give an appropriate picture of the situation in 
Norwegian municipalities today. Although, we do not have any other data to evaluate 
the development of class diversity from 1980 until today, it seems reasonable to claim 
that the portion of the residents that are employed in the service sector has increased 
in the past two decades. A second comment concerns the number of subgroups which 
we use to classify the population. One could claim that three groups is a for crude 
classification scheme that ignores potential subgroups which have a distinct self-
interest toward the political decision-makers. Erikson & Goldthorpe (1992) 
developed, for instance, a much more refined class schema, which mainly 
differentiates the class of non-manual workers into a number of additional classes. 
This might be especially relevant today, since the proportion of people working 
within the service sector is very large and embraces a great proportion of the 
population. 
Notwithstanding these objections against the measurement of class diversity, we 
use this measure of class diversity in our analysis. The measurement of class 
diversity, as presented here, is the only possibility to measure the distribution of the 
population along the social class cleavage in all Norwegian municipalities. We have 
therefore the choice of applying a measurement with some drawbacks or not to 
measure class diversity at all. Moreover, since the social class cleavage is considered 
as one of the most important cleavages in the Norwegian national politics, it seems 
justified to use this measurement of class diversity. 
With regard to the religious cleavage, we calculate a measure of religious 
diversity. In order to calculate this measure of diversity, we use the same data as to 
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calculate the indicator of class diversity – data from the Census 1980. The population 
of the municipalities were classified into three groups: members of the state church, 
members of other religious communities, and persons that are no member of any 
religious community (atheists). 
There are objections against this classification of the population as well. For the 
first, is the specification of the number of subgroups not satisfying. It would probably 
be better to classify the population according to more subjective criteria of belief in a 
particular religion instead of a formal membership. This might be of special relevance 
for the members of the state church, where most Norwegian citizens are a member of, 
from birth. Here it is reasonable to assume that many members participate no longer 
active in religious processions, and do perhaps not believe in Christianity any more. 
Still they are members in the state church because of convenience and tradition. A 
more fruitful classification of the population along the religious cleavage should 
differentiate between active and passive members of religious communities and 
atheists (to which degree the passive members could be classified as atheists may be 
arguable). Another objection against the measurement of religious diversity might be 
that the data from 1980 gives not a valid description of the situation within 
municipalities in the year 2001. This is a reasonable argument, and we could ask 
further which changes are most likely to have happened since 1980. Table 4.1 might 
give us an answer to this question. The table describes the net development of the 
number of members in the state church from 1994 to 2000 (persons that join the state 
church minus persons that leave state church; only data for this period were available 
on the municipal level). The numbers are distributed among municipality size 
according to the classification of the municipalities into eight strata and the table 
shows the average net development within a municipality of the respective stratum. 
In addition, the table shows the relative development with regard to the population 
size pr. 01.01.2001. 
For the period of 1994 to 2000, the data shows that there was a development in the 
direction of secularization, which was characterized by a development where more 
people left the state church than were joint it. What is striking is that there are 
differences between municipalities of different sizes with regard to this development; 
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Table 4.1: The net development of the membershipa in state church in the period 
1994 to 2000; averages for municipality size stratum (N = 354 municipalities) 
Stratum Absolute net development 
Relative net development 
(in percent) N 
1 -7 -0,5 103 
2 -21 -0,5 99 
3 -35 -0,6 47 
4 -57 -0,6 22 
5 -82 -0,7 34 
6 -131 -0,7 21 
7 -250 -0,7 19 
8 -805 -0,8 9 
Total  
(from not aggregated data) -65 -0,6 354 
 
                                                          
a
 Persons that join state church minus persons that leave state church 
 
more people left the state church in larger municipalities than in smaller ones. 
Therefore, it seems likely that the proportion of residents within a municipality that 
are members of the state church is lower in 2001 as it was in 1980, and that the 
decrease of the members was stronger in the larger municipalities than in the smaller 
ones. 
However, Table 4.1 shows also that the process of secularization goes slowly. 
Supposed that the development outlined in the table is representative for the whole 
period from 1980 to 2001, the decrease in the proportion of residents that are 
members in the state church was between 1,5 and 2,4 percentage points (dependent 
on the municipality size stratum). These changes are therefore not of a high 
magnitude. When we, in addition, consider that a overwhelming majority of 
Norwegians are members in the state church, then we can conclude that the difference 
between data collection and analysis is not a really threat against the validity of our 
measurement of religious diversity. With regard to the objections against the number 
of subgroups, the situation is similar as with regard to the measure of class diversity. 
We have the choice between using this measure or not to measure religious diversity 
at all. 
Let us now focus on the demographic cleavage. An indicator of demographic 
diversity measures the distribution of the population along this cleavage line. The 
data we use here were from 1999 and are based on the Central Population Registry 
(Det Sentrale Folkeregister), which combines information from various municipal 
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registries. The population was divided into a total of nine groups; eight groups were 
based on 10-year cohorts (0 to 9 years,…, 70 to 79 years), and a residual category 
was created for those that are older than 79 years. This classification of the 
population was chosen in order to get a rather objective measurement of the 
distribution of the population along the demographic cleavage. As we pointed out 
earlier, was this necessary because we lack a strong theoretical arguments to classify 
the population into another set of subgroups. 
With regard to the family cleavage, we use two different indicators of diversity to 
measure the distribution of the population concerning the family structure. We 
consider two dimensions of a municipality’s family structure as important here: how 
many adults have the daily responsibility for the children in a family, and whether 
families have children living at home or not. 
The first indicator of family diversity (called family 1 diversity in the following) 
measures to which degree the children in a municipality are divided into groups with 
one or two parents. The data, which we will use for this purpose, are from the 
Children’s statistic (Barnestatistikk) from 1999. This statistic is based on every 
unmarried child between 0 and 17 years and indicates whether these children live 
together with married or unmarried parents, single parents, or no parents at all. Based 
on this empirical material, we separate the children into two groups according to the 
number of parents they live together with. Children that had no parents at all were 
dropped from the analysis. 
A second indicator of family diversity (labelled family 2 diversity in the following) 
measures to which extent the families in a municipality have children living at home 
or not. The data used here were from the Family statistic (Familiestatistikk) and are 
from 1997. Based on this data material, we divide the families into a group that has 
children (younger than 20 years) living at home, and families without children living 
at home. 
Finally, an indicator of income diversity measures the distribution of the 
population with regard to their income. The data we use here were from 1992 and are 
based on the Taxation Statistic (Skattestatistikk) published by Statistics Norway. The 
backgrounds of the statistic are all assessments of taxes delivered for the year 1992. 
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As income indicator, the gross income (toppskattegrunnlag) of every resident within a 
municipality older than 13 years will be used. This variable embraces not only the 
income of employed residents or employees, but pensions of retired residents as well. 
The population is separated into eight income groups. The first group embraces those 
residents that did not have any income. Further, we classified those residents with an 
income into six groups with a range of 50 000 Korwegian Kroner (NOK) each. A 
final residual group was created that includes all residents that earn more than 
300 000 NOK in 1992. In order to measure the degree of income diversity, we use a 
rather large number of subgroups as well, in order to describe the distribution of the 
population along the income cleavage as objective as possible (as in the case of 
demographic diversity). 
With regard to the validity of this conceptualization for the research problem, one 
comment is necessary. The income measure that will be most appropriate in the 
context of this work would rather be the household income as the personal income of 
the residents within a municipality. However, these data were not available, and a 
measure that is based on the personal income is anyway better than not to measure 
the income diversity at all. 
4.1.3 Political conflict 
As already mentioned, do we conceptualize the level of political conflict as a variable 
that is measured on the structural level of analysis. In order to measure the level of 
political conflict, we take the party competition within the municipal council as the 
starting point. We assume that a high level of party competition indicates a higher 
degree of disagreement within the municipal council with regard to political 
decisions. Therefore, we use party competition as a substitute measure for the 
political conflict. The composition of the municipal council after the municipal 
election in 1999 is used as the data material in this connection. 
We focus on two aspects of the party competition in order to get a measurement of 
the level of political conflict: the number of parties or local groups that are 
represented in the municipal council, and the degree to which these parties or groups 
approach each other in size. These aspects of the party competition are well known 
sizes from our discussion of the concept of diversity, and reflect our assumption that 
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the structure of subgroups within a municipality is mirrored in the municipal council. 
When calculating these measures, no distinction will be made between local groups 
or political parties that are represented in the municipal council. However, in the 
following, only the term party is used for reasons of simplicity. There are three 
possible conceptualizations of the level of conflict in this respect. 
A first indicator of political conflict could be the number of parties that are 
represented in the municipal council, irrespective of the size of the delegation within 
the municipal council. 
An indicator that compares the relative size of the different parties that are 
represented in the municipal council can be another measure of conflict. This 
measure takes the value of 1 when all parties are of the same size, and it approaches 0 
when one party has a dominating position in the municipal council. In the special 
case when there is only one party represented in the municipal council, the measure is 
defined as being equal to 08. 
A third measure combines the information of the former two indicators in one 
measure. The measure is the index of fractionalization presented by Rae (1971). This 
index takes the value of 0 in the case that there is one party that takes all seats in the 
municipal council and approximates 1 the more parties are represented, and the more 
these parties approximate each other in size. For instance, when two parties are 
represented in the municipal council, and these parties are of the same size, the index 
takes the value of 0,5. Are there three parties of the same size, the index becomes 
0,67 and so on (more examples are in Appendix B). 
In order to decide which of these three possible measures of political conflict to 
use further, we can look on the correlations of these measures with each other and 
with municipality size. Table 4.2 presents these correlation coefficients. When we 
look on the relationship between the conflict measures and municipality size the 
direction of the relationships were not consistent. The number of the parties increases 
with growing municipality size, while the measure of the relative size of the parties is 
                                            
8
 The detailed formulas to calculate the indicator of the relative size of the parties and the index of fractionalization were in 
Appendix B. 
 70
Table 4.1: Correlation matrix (Pearson’s R) of the three alternative measures of 
political conflict and size 
 Log size Conflict 1 Conflict 2 Conflict 3 
Log size 1 0,696 -0,313 0,435 
Conflict 1  1 -0,288 0,741 
Conflict 2   1 0,324 
Conflict 3    1 
Conflict 1: Absolute number of parties 
Conflict 2: Relative size of parties 
Conflict 3: Index of fractionalization 
 
negatively related with municipality size. With regard to these two aspects of party 
competition, we cannot conclude that the level of political conflict increases in larger 
municipalities. It seems that when a municipality increases in size, the number of 
parties increases as well, but at the same is it more likely that one party (or a subset of 
parties) has a dominating position. The index of fractionalization, as the third 
measure of political conflict, appears to describe this contradiction to some degree. 
The correlation between size and the index of fractionalization is positive but weaker 
than the correlation between size and the number of parties. It seems that the 
simultaneous consideration of the relative size resulted in a correction of the rather 
strong relationship between the number of parties and municipality size. 
The index of fractionalization appears therefore as a good measure of political 
conflict that combines both aspects of party competition in which we are interested. 
However, when we look on the relationship between the index of fractionalization 
and the other two measures of conflict, we see that the index is much stronger related 
to the number of parties than to the measurement of their relative size. This 
contradicts to some degree our argumentation from the previous chapter, where we 
pointed out that the relative size of the groups along a cleavage line is a more 
important aspect for the level of conflict as the number of subgroups along a cleavage 
line. Nevertheless, can the absolute number of parties be regarded as a measurement 
of the number of subgroups along all manifest cleavage lines within a municipality. 
This means that this measure embraces aspects of the number of subgroups along a 
cleavage line, but also of the number of cleavage lines as well. Since we cannot 
distinct between those two underlying determinants for the number of parties, without 
considering the political platform of these parties, it seems reasonable to assign a 
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higher weight to the number of parties than to their relative size when we combine 
these two measures into the index of fractionalization. Based on these considerations 
it seems appropriate to use the index of fractionalization as the only conceptualization 
of political conflict in the following analysis. 
4.2 The individual level variables 
On the individual level of analysis we measure three kinds of variables: the extent of 
political interest, the participation in political activities and the control variables. The 
exact wording of the questions in the survey and their coding is in Appendix A. 
4.2.1 Political interest 
Oliver (1999) considers, in his empirical investigation of the relationship between 
economic characteristics of American municipalities and political participation, also 
the political interest of the residents as well. He finds that structural characteristics of 
the municipalities affect the residents’ level of interest in local politics significantly, 
while the level of interest in national politics is mainly affected by individual 
variables. It is difficult to say whether this relationship is the same in Norwegian 
municipalities, but it seems to be reasonable. Consequently, we conceptualize 
political interest as interest in local politics.  
4.2.2 Political participation 
Already in the introductory chapter, we limited the scope of the analysis to embrace 
only three forms of political participation. These three forms are: voting in local 
elections, contacting locally elected officials, and contacting local parties. 
With regard to the participation in local elections, there are actually three potential 
measurements included in the “Size and local democracy in Norway”-survey. One is 
asking about the general likelihood of voting in local elections, the second about the 
probability of casting a vote at the next election, and the third is asking about the 
actual participation at the last election in 1999. In connection with the analytical 
framework of this work, it seems to be most relevant to define participation in a local 
election as the probability to cast a vote if local elections would be held tomorrow. 
The reason for this is that we measure the conflict structure, which is assumed to be 
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the causal reason for the participation in local elections, by the composition of the 
municipal council after the election in 1999. Therefore, the conflict structure 
measured in this analysis is affecting the likelihood to participate in the next 
municipal election and neither the participation at the last election nor the general 
likelihood to participate in local elections is a good conceptualization of the 
likelihood to participate in local elections. 
Table 4.3: Frequency distribution of the answers to the question: “Suppose 
elections for the municipal council were to be held tomorrow, how likely is it that 
you would cast a vote?” The frequency distribution is weighted. 
Likelihood of voting Frequency Percent 
Definitely not 65 4,1 
Quite likely not 74 4,7 
Quite likely 203 13,0 
Definitely 1222 78,2 
Total 1564 100 
 
The answer categories of this variable are four categories ranging from “Definitely” 
to “Definitely not”. Table 4.3 summarizes the frequency distribution of the answers to 
this question. The most obvious feature with the frequency distribution in Table 4.3 is 
that there is a large difference between the actual participation in former local 
elections, and the expressed likelihood of participation in this survey. In the local 
election in 1999, the turnout was 60,4 percent. This is in a great contrast to the 
percentage of respondents that definitely will vote at the next election, which is 78,2 
percent. Moreover, when we consider the proportion of respondents that state that 
they definitely or quite likely are going to vote, the turnout at the next election is 
estimated to be higher than 90%! Of course, it is difficult to say whether the rate of 
participation at the next election will reach nearly 80%. However, this is rather 
unlikely. Since the local election in 1963, there appears to be a clear tendency of 
decreasing turnout rates at local elections in Norway (Bjørklund 2002). It is therefore 
more likely that the turnout rate at the next election will decline rather than increase, 
and an increase of nearly 20 percentage points seems to be completely unrealistic. 
The reason for this overestimation is probably an over reporting from the 
respondents. One reason for this can be that the respondents deliberately lie about 
their future intention of not voting at local elections because they want to comply 
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with social expectations. In an interview, the respondents will therefore not admit to 
the interviewer that they do not intent to vote. Another reason for the over reporting 
might be that the respondents really have the intention to vote, but since it is a long 
period of time until the next election, some respondents might change their minds. 
Another reason for the overestimation might be due to a sampling bias. It appears that 
persons with higher education were more likely to participate in the survey (Rose 
2002b), and since education is an important factor in explaining participation in 
politics, it might be that the respondents in the survey are actually more likely to 
participate in local elections than the average population. 
The consequences of this overestimation for our analysis depend on the causes for 
the overestimation. In the first case, an over report of the actual participation, the 
result of the analysis will be biased because respondents that not really have the 
intention to vote at the next election are treated as potential voters. In the latter case, a 
sampling bias, the result of the analysis is not biased, since the respondents answered 
correctly. On the other hand, the results might be not representative for the 
Norwegian population as a whole since the sample is biased. Unfortunately, it is not 
possible to ascertain which one of these two factors causes the overestimation. It is 
probably a combination of both factors. Consequentially, we do not know whether the 
result of our analysis is biased or rather unrepresentative for the whole population. 
Anyway, it is clear that the results have to be treated with caution.  
The other two forms of participation, contacting politicians and contacting parties, 
are in the “Size and local democracy in Norway”-survey measured by a battery of 
questions which requests the respondents to indicate if they, in the last two years, 
have participated in thirteen different forms of political participation. Two of these 
questions ask about the respondents contact with elected municipal politicians and a 
local political party. The answer categories of these two measurements were a 
dichotomy, yes or no. 
Also with regard to these variables, we can expect some forms of biases. The 
decision to comply with social expectations is probably not important since 
contacting politicians and parties is not a behaviour that is socially expected. 
However, the sampling bias can again result in an overestimation of the level of 
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participation. Finally, another source of error is relevant here – an error of recall. 
Since the questions measures participation in the last two years, it is possible that 
some persons have forgotten whether they have contacted politicians or parties in this 
period. This might result in an underestimation of the level of participation. 
Unfortunately, we do not have a more reliable alternative measure of the level of 
participation in these political acts and we are therefore dependent of the measures 
that we have presented here. 
4.2.3 The control variables 
In Chapter 2, we introduced six variables, which probably are correlated with 
municipality size and the level of participation simultaneously. Therefore, in order to 
achieve a correct estimation of the direct effect of municipality size on the level of 
participation, we have to include these six variables as control variables in our 
regression analysis. Unfortunately, the software that we are going to use in the 
analysis does not allow an inclusion of more than three control variables (this will be 
discussed further in Chapter 6), and we have therefore to limit the number of control 
variables. Consequentially, we include the following three control variables into the 
analysis: the level of education and two measures of the resident’s sense of 
effectiveness. 
In the survey “Size and local democracy in Norway” the level of education of the 
respondents were data from official registers. We can therefore assume that these data 
have a high degree of validity and reliability, although we cannot rule out registration 
errors. The level of education is measured on a four-point scale (see Appendix A). 
We measure a respondent’s sense of effectiveness by two variables: the 
respondents’ internal efficacy and their external efficacy. The degree of internal 
efficacy is supposed to measure the individuals understanding of politics and their 
ability to participate. This is measured by an index that combines the answer on two 
questions, which ask about the respondents’ evaluation of her qualification to 
participate in politics and about the respondents understanding of municipal politics. 
The answers on these two questions were coded on four-point scales, and we 
constructed an additive index of internal efficacy with four categories from these 
questions. 
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External efficacy refers another dimension of efficacy. A person is supposed to 
have a high level of external efficacy when this person thinks that her political 
activities really can influence political processes. To measure this variable, we used a 
question in the survey that requests the respondents to state whether they feel that 
municipal politicians pay attention to the opinion of the residents. The answer to this 
variable is measured in four categories. 
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5. Analysis part one: structural level analysis 
In the previous chapters, we have outlined the theoretical framework of this analysis 
and discussed the empirical measurements of all variables. All preparations for the 
data analysis were finished, and we can now start the analysis of our data. The data 
analysis is carried out in two parts. First, we consider the relationship between the 
variables on the structural level, and in the second part, we carry out a multilevel 
analysis, where we combine the structural and individual data. 
In this part of the analysis, the tenability of our hypotheses concerning the 
relationship between the structural variables is in the focus. Therefore, the first two 
hypotheses that we introduced in the first chapter will be tested. The questions that 
we expect to get an answer to are the following: is there a positive relationship 
between municipality size and the level of diversity? And is the level of diversity and 
the size of a municipality related positively to the degree of political conflict within a 
municipality? 
In order to throw light on these questions, data from all 435 municipalities in 
Norway will be analyzed. Consequently, the statistical parameters are not subject to 
errors due to the sampling methods, and levels of significance are not necessary to 
evaluate the accuracy of the statistical estimation (although they will be used in the 
regression analyses to estimate the significance of the various independent variables 
in explaining the variation of the dependent variable). 
The analysis in this chapter is separated into two parts, according to the two 
hypotheses that we were testing. In the first part, we analyze the relationship between 
municipality size and the various measures of diversity. Thereafter, we include our 
measure of political conflict into the analysis, and investigate how municipality size 
and diversity affects the level of conflict. 
5.1 The bivariate relationship between size and diversity 
In order to get a first impression of the relationship between size and our six 
measures of diversity, Table 5.1 presents the bivariate correlation coefficients 
between these variables. 
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Table 5.1: Bivariate correlation coefficients (Pearson’s R) between municipality 
size and six measures of diversity 
Class diversity -0,638 
Religious diversity 0,330 
Demographic diversity -0,470 
Family diversity 1: 
number of parents 0,276 
Family diversity 2: 
Children living at home 0,042 
Income diversity 0,704 
 
As we can see, the relationship between size and diversity is ambiguous. The strength 
of the relationship varies between very weak values, such as for family 2 diversity (R 
= 0,042), and quite strong values, such as the relationship between size and income 
diversity (R = 0,704). Additionally, the direction of the relationship is variable as 
well: class and demographic diversity are negatively related to municipality size, 
while the other kinds of diversity are positively related to size. The data does 
therefore not support the general assumption that larger municipalities are more 
diverse than smaller ones. According to our data, larger municipalities are less 
diverse with regard to class and the age distribution than smaller municipalities are. 
Nevertheless, correlation coefficients are very crude measures of relationships. 
Therefore, the association between size and the various forms of diversity is 
examined in more detail in order to understand which changes take place when we 
move from smaller municipalities to larger ones. To make the presentation of the data 
in this part of the analysis more evident, the presentation is based on the classification 
of municipalities in eight strata (see section 1.3). 
Figure 5.1 illustrates the distribution of the population with regard to the class 
cleavage in the eight strata. From Table 5.1 we see that the correlation coefficient 
between class diversity and municipality size is -0,638, and the figure reveals the 
reason for this negative relationship; the proportion of persons working in non-
manual professions becomes more and more dominating in larger municipalities. The 
share of residents with non-manual professions increases from 55% in Stratum 1 to 
75% in Stratum 8. This increase is mirrored by a corresponding decrease in the 
percentage of people working in the primary sector. Their share of the population 
decreases from 22% in Stratum 1 to 2% in Stratum 8. At the same time, the portion of 
 78
 
0
0,2
0,4
0,6
0,8
1
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Stratum
Pr
o
po
rt
io
n
 
o
f p
o
pu
la
tio
n
Non-manual workers Farm workers
Manual workers
Figure 5.1: Average distribution of the population within a municipality among 
three different groups of professions (in 1980); by municipality size strata 
manual workers is rather constant throughout all strata, though the portion is slightly 
higher in municipalities of medium size. 
Therefore, it is correct to maintain that the smaller municipalities are “more likely 
to be oriented toward agriculture or to have a relatively simple economic structure” 
(Dahl & Tufte 1973: 33). The proportion of residents working in the primary sector is 
indeed largest in the smallest municipalities, while the proportion of residents 
working in the non-manual sector is at its minimum in these municipalities. It appears 
that a development of transforming the economic structure from a traditional society 
to a service producing society has happened. This transformation process has also 
occurred in the smallest municipalities, but they have not come as far in this process 
as the larger municipalities have. 
As mentioned earlier, we have to take into account that the group of persons 
working in non-manual professions is very diverse itself. A further distinction of this 
group into subgroups with would undoubtedly result in a more diverse composition of 
the population in the larger municipalities, and probably render the relationship 
between size and diversity in the opposite direction – i.e. larger municipalities would 
appear as more diverse than the smaller ones. However, since we are not able to 
classify the population in a more detailed class scheme with the data at hand, we can 
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Figure 5.1: Average distribution of the population within a municipality 
among three different religious groups (in 1980); by municipality size strata 
only speculate about the consequences of a detailed class scheme for the relationship 
between size and class diversity. 
With regard to religious diversity, Figure 5.2 shows that there are three reasons for 
the increase in diversity with growing municipality size. If we concentrate on the 
changes in the group size when we move from stratum 1 to stratum 8, we see that the 
portion of members in the state church decreases slightly but steadily. Additionally 
the portion of members of other denominations increases slightly, and finally the 
proportion of atheists increases marginally as well. However, it is important to point 
out that the changes are of very low magnitude; the proportion of members of the 
state church declines by only six percentage points from 96% to 90%. 
As in the case of class diversity, a different classification of the population might 
yield another result with regard to the relationship between religious diversity and 
size. We mentioned already earlier that the separation of the religious residents into 
active and passive members. Again, we can only speculate about the possible 
consequences of such a division into alternative subgroups. One possibility would be 
to collapse the passive members of the state church with the group of persons that are 
not members in any religious community. In this case, we can assume that the group 
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Table 5.2: Average distribution of the population within a municipality among 
nine age groups (in 1999); by municipality size strata (in percent) 
Age in years Stratum 0 – 9 10 – 19 20 – 29 30 – 39 40 – 49 50 – 59 60 – 69 70 – 79 80 –  
1 13 13 12 13 13 12 09 09 06 100 
2 13 13 13 13 14 12 08 08 05 100 
3 14 13 13 14 14 12 08 08 05 100 
4 14 13 14 14 14 12 08 07 04 100 
5 14 13 14 14 14 12 08 07 04 100 
6 14 13 13 15 14 12 08 07 03 100 
7 13 12 14 15 14 12 08 08 04 100 
8 14 11 15 16 14 11 07 07 04 100 
 
of atheists/passive members would be rather large. In addition, is it reasonable that 
this group would be larger in bigger municipalities than in smaller ones. However, 
the consequence of this alternative division of the population for the relationship 
between size and religious diversity is ambiguous. And certainly is the decision to 
collapse passive members of the state church and atheists into one group disputable. 
For demographic diversity, the correlation coefficient between size and the degree 
of diversity is estimated to -0,470. This negative relationship implies that larger 
municipalities have a less diverse composition with regard to age than smaller 
municipalities. As we can see in Table 5.2, the smallest municipalities are 
characterized by a situation, which is close to our definition of total heterogeneity – 
all age groups are of approximately the same size. The only exceptions are the age 
groups of 60 years and older, which probably for biological reasons, are a bit smaller 
than the other age cohorts are. 
With increasing municipality size, we see that the picture changes. The proportion 
of persons between 20 and 39 years increases somewhat. At the same time decreases 
the proportion of persons between 10 and 19 years and over 60 years slightly. The 
size of the other age cohorts is quite stable throughout the eight strata. Based on these 
data we can hypothesize whether a person’s life cycle gives a reasonable explanation 
for the pattern that we have found: beyond secondary education persons are likely to 
seek out larger municipalities – probably because of better education and job 
opportunities. Thereafter, when a family is founded and the career has reached a 
certain point, some persons return to their origin or simply move out of the city to 
some quiet suburb, to avoid a more hectic urban life. 
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Figure 5.3: Average proportion of children (younger than 18 years) within a 
municipality with one or two parents (in 1999); by municipality size stratum 
0
0,2
0,4
0,6
0,8
1
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Stratum
Pr
o
po
rt
io
n
 
o
f c
hi
ld
re
n
Children with two parents Children with single parent
With regard to the first indicator of family diversity, we estimated a correlation 
coefficient with municipality size of 0,276. The reason for the positive relationship is 
that the proportion of children with only one parent increases with growing 
municipality size (see Figure 5.3). In the smallest municipalities (stratum 1), 85% of 
all children live with two parents in the household, while only 80% of all children 
live with two parents in stratum 8. 
For the second indicator of family diversity, the proportion of families with or 
without children living at home, the picture is different. We calculated a correlation 
coefficient with municipality size of 0,042, which suggests that there is nearly no 
relationship between municipality size and the composition of the population with 
regard to this measure. However, as Figure 5.4 reveals, the reason for this is that the 
relationship is curvilinear, not that there is no relationship between these two 
variables at all. 
In the special case of two groups, a large difference between the proportions of the 
two groups indicates a lower degree of diversity, while a smaller difference means 
that the level of diversity is high. Considering this, we see from Figure 5.4 that the 
diversity is highest in the municipalities of medium size (stratum 4 and 5), while the 
diversity is lower at the extreme points of the municipality size scale (stratum 1 and 
8). Nevertheless, it shows clearly from the figure, that the largest municipalities are 
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Figure 5.4: Average proportion of families within a municipality with and 
without children (younger than 20 years) living at home (in 1997); by 
municipality size strata 
less diverse than the smallest municipalities – the percentage difference in stratum 1 
is 20 percentage points, while the difference in stratum 8 is 26 percentage points. We 
can therefore characterize the relationship between municipality size and family 2 
diversity as a curvilinear relationship with an underlying negative tendency. These 
kinds of relationship are badly summarized by a Pearson’s R coefficient. 
Finally, there is the measure of income diversity. The correlation between this 
diversity measure and municipality size is a high 0,705. Table 5.3 presents the 
distribution of the population among various income groups in 1992. As this table 
shows, the reason for the positive relationship between municipality size and income 
diversity is that the variation between the income groups is larger in the smaller 
municipalities than in the larger ones. In the smallest municipalities, the population is 
dominated by persons that have a cross yearly income of between 0 and 100 000 
Norwegian Kroner (NOK). About 47% of the population are in this group. On the 
other hand, only 13% of the population in Stratum 1 have a yearly income of more 
than 200 000 NOK. However, the picture changes when we move to the larger 
municipalities. In Stratum 8, the different income groups are more equal in size. The 
proportion of residents that have an income of between 0 and 100 000 NOK is now 
only 33%, while 25% of all residents earn more than 200 000 NOK a year. The share 
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Table 5.3: Average distribution of the population within a municipality among 
eight income groups (in 1992); by municipality size strata (in percent) 
Yearly personal cross income in thousand Norwegian Kroner 
Stratum 0 0 –  50  
50 –  
100  
100 – 
150 
150 – 
200 
200 – 
250 
250 – 
300 300 – 
 
1 09 19 28 16 14 08 03 02 100 
2 10 18 25 16 15 09 03 03 100 
3 11 17 24 16 16 09 04 03 100 
4 11 17 22 15 15 10 05 04 100 
5 12 16 21 15 16 10 05 05 100 
6 12 16 20 15 16 11 05 06 100 
7 12 15 21 15 16 11 05 05 100 
8 13 14 19 15 15 11 06 08 100 
 
of people earning between 100 000 and 200 000 NOK is relatively constant over all 
strata, whereas the proportion of residents without any income increases with 
growing municipality size. 
5.1.1 Summary: the relationship between size and diversity 
According to our first hypothesis, we assume that larger municipalities are more 
diverse than smaller municipalities are. In this section, we measured the level of 
diversity in each municipality by considering the distribution of the residents along 
cleavage lines that have been defined theoretically. However, this empirical material 
supports the hypothesis only partly. With regard to three of our six diversity 
measures, the relationship between size and diversity is positive; for two other 
measures of diversity, the relationship is negative (see Table 5.1). In addition, one 
measure of diversity is curvilinear related to size. The measurement of family 2 
diversity indicates that municipalities of medium size are the most diverse 
municipalities with regard to this kind of diversity. Therefore, it is not possible to 
draw a clear conclusion with regard to the first hypothesis. The direction of the 
relationship between size and diversity is obviously dependent on which kind of 
diversity we consider. 
It is important to remember that the definition of subgroups affect the 
measurement of diversity; another classification of the population into subgroups can 
change the relationship between size and diversity. This is especially true for the 
measures of class and religious diversity. Although we can only speculate about the 
consequences of an alternative classification of the population on the relationship to 
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municipality size, is it not likely to assume that the general pattern of the relationship 
between size and diversity changes in favour with our assumptions. There will still be 
variation in the direction of the relationship between size and diversity. 
5.2 Size, diversity, and political conflict 
Let us now consider our second hypothesis. In this hypothesis, we assumed that size 
and diversity is positively related to the level of political conflict. Therefore, we 
investigate to which degree the level of political conflict can be traced back to the 
size of a municipality and its level of diversity. We carry out this analysis in two 
parts: First, we concentrate on the bivariate relationship between the level of conflict 
on one side, and respectively municipality size and the level of diversity on the other 
side. This will give us information about the direction and the strength of the 
relationships. Thereafter, in the second part of the analysis, we apply multivariate 
methods. With this method, we can find out if the diversity measures have a direct 
effect on the level of political conflict, even when we control for the effect of size. If 
not, the diversity measures are only a substitute measure for size, and might be 
dropped from the further analysis. 
5.2.1 The bivariate relationship 
The bivariate relationship between municipality size and the level of conflict, which 
is measured by the index of fractionalization, is illustrated in the scatter plot in Figure 
5.5. In addition to the 435 municipalities in Norway (which are indicated as dots or 
crosses), we have outlined two regression lines in the figure. One regression line is 
the result of an ordinary linear regression model, where size predicts the index of 
fractionalization (labelled linear function). The other regression line describes a 
curvilinear relationship between size and the index of fractionalization (labelled 
curvilinear function). This corresponds to a regression model with size and a 
quadratic size term as independent variables. 
On first sight, the linear function seems to fit the data material fairly well; the 
smaller municipalities have generally smaller values on the index of fractionalization 
than the larger municipalities have. On the other side, it seems that the municipalities 
of medium size have the highest values on the index of fractionalization; this 
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Figure 5.5: The 435 Norwegian municipalities by size and their index of 
fractionalization. The crosses indicate “outlier” municipalities. Two regression 
lines of size on the index of fractionalization are outlined in the figure. 
 
indicates that the curvilinear function might summarize the distribution of the 
municipalities better than the linear function. In order to decide whether the linear 
function or the curvilinear function fits the data in Figure 5.5 better, we have to 
compare the results of the estimation of these two models. In the case that the 
curvilinear function fits the data better, we expect that the quadratic size term is 
significant, and that the amount of the explained variance increases considerably 
when we introduce the quadratic size term into the regression line. 
It is not difficult to see from Table 5.4 that the curvilinear function fits the data 
better than the linear function. The quadratic size term is highly significant and due to 
its inclusion, the explained variance increases significantly (R2 increases from 0,190 
percent to 0,263 percent, an increase of about 40 percent)9. However, one may object 
that the curvilinear function fits better to the data because the data set contains a 
number of municipalities that take unusual values on the index of fractionalization, 
compared to other municipalities of about the same size (so called outliers). There are 
                                            
9
 The level of significance is presented in the table as the p-value, which indicates exactly how unusual the observed result 
would be if H0 (beta equal to zero) would be true (Kleinbaum et al. 1998: 26); a low p-value corresponds therefore with a 
high level of statistical significance of the estimated beta value, which means that beta is most likely unequal to zero 
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Table 5.4: Results of the estimation of two regression models with the index of 
fractionalization as the dependent variable (N = 435) 
Linear function Curvilinear function 
 Beta p-value Beta p-value 
Municipality size 0,435 < 0,001 0,533 <0,001 
(Municipality size)2 – – -0,288 <0,001 
Explained variance – R2 0,190 0,263 
 
six municipalities in the data set, three of the smallest municipalities and the three 
largest municipalities, that have lower values on the index of fractionalization as the 
linear function would predict (these municipalities are marked by crosses in Figure 
5.5). These municipalities could be the cause for the curvilinear relationship, because 
they pull the average values of the index of fractionalization down at the ends of the 
size scale. In order to investigate this possibility, we re-estimate the curvilinear 
regression model without these six municipalities, and see whether the quadratic size 
term is still significant. 
Table 5.5 presents the results of the re-estimation without the outliers, and reveals 
that the quadratic size term is still highly significant with a p-value of less than 0,001. 
However, and this is not surprising, does the curvilinear function in this case explain 
less of the variation of the index of fractionalization; only 20 percent of the variation 
is explained, and the increase of the explained variance due to the inclusion of the 
squared size term is now only about 17 percent. Nevertheless, the curvilinear function 
is significant even after the deletion of possible problematic municipalities. 
Consequently, we can conclude that, according to our empirical material, the level of 
political conflict is highest in municipalities of medium size. 
Table 5.5: Results of the estimation of two regression models with the index of 
fractionalization as the dependent variable; without outliers (N = 429) 
Linear function Curvilinear function 
 Beta p-value Beta p-value 
Municipality size 0,414 < 0,001 0,405 <0,001 
(Municipality size)2 – – -0,178 <0,001 
Explained variance – R2 0,171 0,200 
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Table 5.6: Six bivariate regression analysis, with the index of fractionalization 
as the independent variable 
Independent variable Beta p-value R2 
Class diversity -0,269 <0,001 0,072 
    
Religious diversity 0,182 <0,001 0,033 
    
Demographic diversity -0,346 <0,001 0,120 
    
Family 1 diversity -0,034 0,48 0,001 
    
Family 2 diversity 0,247 <0,001 0,061 
    
Income diversity 0,372 <0,001 0,138 
 
In order to get an impression about the relationship between political conflict and our 
six measures of diversity, we calculated six regression models. In each of these 
regression models, a different measure of diversity is the independent variable that 
explains the variation of the index of fractionalization. The results of this analysis are 
in Table 5.6. 
It appears that all measures of diversity, with the exception of the measure of 
family 1 diversity, are significantly related to the index of fractionalization. However, 
the individual measures of diversity vary according to the amount of variation, which 
they explain of the dependent variable; R2 varies between 0,001 and 0,138. No single 
measure of diversity has therefore the same explanatory power than the size variable 
alone. Still, the measures of diversity together might explain a considerable amount 
of variation of the index of fractionalization, but this depends on the correlation 
interaction between the various diversity measures. It is possible that the individual 
diversity measures explain about the same components of the variation of the index 
of fractionalization. In this case, the six diversity measures together explain not much 
more of the variation than the single measure of diversity that has the strongest 
explanatory power (income diversity). On the other hand, when the diversity 
measures do not interact with each other considerably, it is possible that each 
diversity measure explains a unique part of the variation of the independent variable. 
In this case, the diversity measures together might explain as much as the sum of the 
six R2 values in Table 5.6. In the next section, where we apply multivariate methods, 
we will therefore see whether all diversity measures together explain considerably 
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more of the variation of the dependent variable than the measure of income diversity 
alone does. 
With regard to the direction of the relationship between diversity and the level of 
conflict, the results of the analysis draw an ambiguous picture. Among the five 
measures of diversity that are significantly related to the index of fractionalization, 
two measures were negatively related to the index. These two measures were class 
diversity and demographic diversity. It is surprising that these measures of diversity 
also were negatively related to the size of a municipality (see Table 5.1). This means 
that size still has a positive indirect effect on the level of conflict, via class and 
demographic diversity; the larger a municipality, the less diverse is the municipality 
with regard to class and demography, and the higher is the level of conflict. 
5.2.2 The multivariate relationship 
Table 5.7 presents the results of two multivariate regression models. One regression 
model contains our six diversity measures as the independent variable (Model 5.1), 
while the other model includes size and the quadratic size term as additional 
independent variables (Model 5.2). The dependent variable in both models is the 
index of fractionalization. 
When we compare the results of the estimation of Model 5.1 with the results in 
Table 5.6, we see that the explanatory power of Model 5.1 is higher than the 
explanatory power of the model with income diversity as the only independent 
variable. This is not unexpected, because the inclusion of several independent 
variables always increases the amount of explained variance. However, the R2-values 
in Model 5.1 is still much lower than the sum of all R2-values in Table 5.6. This 
indicates that our six diversity measures explain the same variance components of the 
dependent variable, to a large degree. The differences of the levels of significance 
between Table 5.6 and Model 5.1 support this conclusion. All six measures are less 
significant in Model 5.1. No measure of diversity is significant at 1 percent anymore, 
and the most significant measure of diversity (income diversity) has a p-value of 
0,046. In addition to this measure, only class diversity and the measure of family 2 
diversity are significant at 10 percent. Therefore, we can conclude that the measures 
of diversity interact rather strongly with each other in explaining the index of 
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fractionalization; the strong bivariate relationship between the diversity measures and 
political conflict disappears when we consider the diversity measures simultaneously. 
It seems that not all six measures of diversity are important to explain the level of 
conflict within a municipality; the most important forms of diversity are class 
diversity, the second form of family diversity and income diversity. 
Table 5.7: Results of the estimation of two regression models with the index of 
fractionalization as the dependent variable 
Model 5.1 Model 5.2 
 Beta p-value Beta p-value 
Municipaity size – – 0,492* <0,001 
(Municipality size)2 – – -0,266* <0,001 
Class diversity -0,132*** 0,064 -0,088 0,183 
Religious diversity 0,074 0,134 0,081*** 0,075 
Demographic diversity -0,071 0,386 -0,123 0,105 
Family 1 diversity -0,072 0,188 -0,152* 0,003 
Family 2 diversity 0,135*** 0,051 0,063 0,346 
Income diversity 0,163** 0,046 -0,097 0,247 
Explained variance – R2 0,170 0,309 
*…significant at 1%; **…significant at 5%; ***…significant at 10% 
 
The next question is whether the pattern of the relationship between the various forms 
of diversity and political conflict, which we found in Model 5.1, consists after the 
inclusion of the size variables into the analysis. When we compare the estimation 
result of Model 5.1 with Model 5.2, we see that the changes are considerable. The 
inclusion of the size variables changes the significance of the diversity measures. 
Three measures become more significant, while the other three measures become less 
significant. This results in a situation where the three measures of diversity, which are 
significant when in Model 5.1 are no longer significant in Model 5.2. Furthermore, 
two other measures of diversity become significant when we include the size 
variables. The measures of family 1 diversity and religious diversity are significant 
on 1 percent and 10 percent, respectively, in Model 5.2. The reason for the increased 
significance of these two diversity measures is not entirely clear. However, in the 
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case of the measure of family 1 diversity, we might speculate that the indirect effect 
on conflict via municipality size has a different direction as the direct effect of the 
diversity measure on conflict. Therefore, the estimation of the bivariate effect on 
political conflict, without considering size at the same time, results in an 
underestimation of the effect, since this estimation includes also the indirect effect, 
which has a different direction. For religious diversity, there might be a similar effect 
with regard to the squared size term. 
The direction of the two diversity measures that are statistically significant in 
Model 5.2 is ambiguous. We expect the level of diversity to be positively related to 
the level of conflict, but in reality, only the measure of religious diversity relates 
positively to the level of conflict. The measure of family 1 diversity, on the other 
hand relates negatively to the level of conflict. It is therefore difficult to draw a clear 
conclusion with regard to the direction of the relationship between diversity and 
conflict. 
With regard to the changes in the explained variance, we see that the inclusion of 
the size terms increases R2 considerably. When we compare the values of R2 in 
Model 5.1 to those in Model 5.2, we find that R2 has increased by nearly 81 percent. 
The regression model that contains only the diversity measures has a R2 of 0,170, 
while the inclusion of the two size terms results in a R2 of 0,309. It seems therefore 
that the size variable is by far more important to predict the level of political conflict 
than any single diversity measure. We can also put this the other way around, and 
compare the results from Table 5.4 with the results of Table 5.8. In Table 5.4, we see 
that size and the squared size term explain about 26% of the variation of the index of 
fractionalization. When we include the six diversity measures as well, R2 increases 
(from 0,263 to 0,309), but only with about 17 percent. According to the changes in 
R2, it appears that the diversity measures have only a limited importance to predict 
the index of fractionalization. 
5.2.3 Summary: the relationship between size/diversity and conflict 
In our second hypothesis, we assume that size and diversity were positive related to 
the level of political conflict, and that the direct effect of size on political conflict is 
significant, even when we control for the level of diversity, and vice versa. With 
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regard to size, the data material supports this assumption. Size has a rather strong 
effect on the level of political conflict within a municipality, and the introduction of 
the diversity variables into the analysis does not change this. Moreover, size is the 
most important single variable of all independent variables considered in this section, 
with regard to predict the level of political conflict. However, size appears to be 
curvilinear related to the level of conflict, with an underlying positive relationship. 
Within the theoretical framework of this analysis, it might be surprising that the size 
of a municipality is the most important variable to predict the level of conflict. 
Municipality size is supposed to affect the level of conflict only by the absolute size 
of the subgroups, and this is only one of four determinants of political conflict. 
However, municipality size might in this analysis also be a substitute measure of the 
number of subgroups within a municipality, which again can be assumed to be 
relevant to predict a municipalities value on the index of fractionalization. Since we 
do not have a measure of the number of subgroups, and this variable at the same time 
is likely to be highly correlated with the size variable, it is reasonable to assume that 
an inclusion of the number of subgroups in the analysis would reduce the significance 
of size to predict the level of conflict. 
Concerning a municipality’s level of diversity, the data material does only support 
our assumptions to a lesser degree. Although all diversity measures, with the 
exception of one, have a significant effect on the level of conflict when we consider 
the bivariate relationships, the level of significance drops when we consider all 
measures of diversity simultaneously in a regression model. This is probably because 
the measures of diversity are correlated with each other and the conflict variable 
simultaneously, which means that the various diversity measures explain identical 
parts of the variation of the conflict variable. As Table 5.7 reveals, only three of the 
six diversity measures were significant at 10 percent in the regression model that 
contains all diversity measures; and the level of significance of the three measures 
were rather low. The inclusion of the size variables into the regression model has two 
opposing effects on the level of significance of the diversity measures: three measures 
of diversity increase their level of significance, while the effect of the other three 
diversity measures become less significant. In sum, only two diversity measures have 
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a significant effect at a 10% and 1% level, respectively. The direction of the effect of 
these two diversity measures is ambiguous; one diversity measure relates positively 
to the conflict level and the other negative. Therefore, the assumption that diversity 
has a positive effect on the level of conflict gets only very limited support from the 
data. 
The size of a municipality appears therefore to be the most important factor to 
predict the level of conflict within a municipality. However, one may object to this 
statement that our conceptualization – the index of fractionalization – weights the 
number of parties heavier than the relative size of the parties (we have discussed this 
in Chapter 4). One may agree to the assumption that the size of a municipality is 
stronger related to the number of parties (since size might be a substitute measure of 
the number of subgroups), while the diversity measures are stronger related to the 
relative size of the parties. In this case, it is not surprising that size is the most 
important variable to explain the index of fractionalization. However, the estimation 
of three regression models with the indicator of the relative size of parties as the 
dependent variable does not support that view (for the results of the analysis see 
Appendix C). Even in this case the size variable seems to be the most important 
single variable with regard to the amount of variance explained. 
Therefore, it seems to be a reasonable conclusion from this part of the analysis, to 
say that the data does not support our assumptions with regard to the relationship 
between the diversity measures and the level of conflict. The diversity measures are 
not very important to explain conflict, and their effects do not follow the pattern that 
we expected. Since it seems difficult to find an alternative explanation for our results 
concerning the diversity measures, we exclude the measures of diversity from the 
further analysis. 
5.3 Diversity and conflict: some remarks 
The results concerning the relationship between diversity and political conflict can be 
interpreted in two ways. One possible interpretation can be that there is a strong 
relationship between a municipality’s group structure and the level of conflict, but 
that our conceptualizations of diversity and conflict could not measure this 
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relationship. It is clear that we had to make a number of reservations in order to be 
able to measure the diversity of a municipality; we assumed theoretically which 
cleavage lines could be significant for local politics and which subgroups are standing 
against each other along these cleavage lines. In addition, diversity was measured on 
the structural level. In this way, we cannot evaluate whether cleavage lines are 
overlapping or crosscutting. However, an more thoroughly analysis of the cleavage 
structure in Norwegian municipalities on the individual level requires a rather large 
sample of respondents in a great number of municipalities. 
Moreover, a detailed measurement of the cleavage structure in Norwegian 
municipalities will perhaps not give another result, because there is also the 
possibility that the cleavage structure of a municipality is not relevant for the 
composition of the municipal council. It might be that party competition is not 
relevant in municipal politics. Skare (2000) gives a number of reasons for this, and 
mentions, for instance, institutional factors that imply that municipal politics can be 
characterized as consensual. In addition, he argues that the municipal cleavages do 
not correspond with the party cleavages. Consequently, it is possible that the residents 
within a municipality do not vote for local parties based on the attachment to 
municipal subgroups, but because of national party identifications or because of 
preferences for particular candidates. In this case, another conceptualization of 
political conflict would be more appropriate as well. A measurement of political 
conflict should not take the municipal council as a starting point. Because of its 
consensual character, the municipal council might cover over political conflicts that 
might be in municipalities. A conceptualization of political conflict as an individual 
variable might be more appropriate for this analysis. 
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6. Analysis part two: Multilevel analysis 
In we consider variables from both levels of analysis simultaneously. The objective 
of this analysis is it to test the assumptions of our third hypothesis: Are residents in 
municipalities with a higher level of conflict more interested in local politics? And 
are residents that are more interested in politics, in turn, more likely to participate in 
politics? Finally, we consider the effect of municipality size as well. Following 
logically from our three hypotheses, we can deduce that residents in larger 
municipalities are more likely to participate in politics. Does our data support that 
view? 
In order to answer these questions, we combine our data about the structural 
characteristics of the Norwegian municipalities with the individual data. As a result, 
the analysis is now restricted to the 64 municipalities that are included in the “Size 
and local democracy in Norway”-survey. For each of these 64 municipalities, our 
data material contains between 16 and 39 observations, which sums up to 1560 
respondents. However, the analysis of these data requires special attention. Therefore, 
we discuss methodological concerns with regard to the data analysis and present the 
strategy of analysis, before we start the empirical analysis. 
6.1 Methodological issues 
Three characteristics of the data require further attention. These characteristics are: 
the nested structure of the data, the dichotomous distribution of the dependent 
variables, and the disproportional sampling design. In this section, we will briefly 
discuss the consequences of these properties for the data for the analysis in this 
chapter. 
6.1.1 The nested data structure 
The most important property of our data material is its nested structure. With nested 
structure, we refer to the sampling design that was carried out in two stages: First, a 
sample of 64 municipalities was drawn, and thereafter a sample of respondents within 
each of these municipalities was selected. With other words, we could say that the 
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respondents were nested within the 64 municipalities. When we use “ordinary”, 
statistical methods to analyze these data we have two alternatives, which both have its 
disadvantages: we could carry out the analysis on the municipal level, which means 
that we have to aggregate the individual data. This implies that we introduce the 
individual data in the analysis by calculating mean values for each municipality. In 
this way, we do not use all information in the data because we ignore the variation of 
the individual data within the municipalities. Alternatively, we could disaggregate 
the data and carry out the analysis on the individual level. In this case, we have to 
assign the values of the variables measured on the municipal level to each 
respondent; those living in the same municipality would therefore have the same 
values. This method of data analysis “produces” a number of observations that are not 
statistically independent of each other, but that will be treated as statistically 
independent in the data analysis. Therefore, we break a fundamental condition of 
statistical inference, and the levels of significance are probably over-estimated. The 
relationship between variables appears as more significant as it is in reality. The 
disadvantages of these approaches are discussed in more detail in Hox (2002:3). 
As an alternative to the analysis of the data on one level of analysis, we can apply 
special statistical techniques that incorporate the data from both levels of analysis 
simultaneously. The solution for this problem is therefore to apply, so called, 
methods of multilevel analysis. A number of textbooks were available that deal with 
this issue, such as Heck & Thomas (2000), Hox (2002), Kreft & De Leeuw (1998), 
Leyland & Goldstein (2001), or Snijders & Bosker (1999). These methods of 
multilevel modelling consider the nested data structure and estimate the regression 
coefficients and their levels of significance without bias. In addition, these methods 
allow regression coefficients to vary between the macro units (which are 
municipalities in our case). Within these models, we distinguish between variables 
with fixed effects, which are not supposed to vary between the macro units, and 
random effects, which are supposed to vary between the macro units. It can be either 
the intercept alone or a combination of the intercept and the slopes of some 
independent variables that are random effects. In the former case these models are 
called random intercept models and in the latter case random slope models. 
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In our analysis, we will work with random intercept models that allow the intercept 
to vary between the 64 municipalities in our sample. In this way, we can estimate a 
regression line for each municipality that has a distinct intercept, but is otherwise 
identical with the other regression lines. The degree of variation of the intercept (the 
so-called variance component) between these 64 municipalities is therefore an 
indication of the differences in the likelihood of participation between the 
municipalities. Is the value of the random intercept nearly or equal to zero, this 
implies that there are (nearly) no differences between the municipalities with regard 
to the outcome variable. The likelihood of participation is the same in all 
municipalities. On the other hand, the larger the variance component, the more 
different are the municipality with regard to the likelihood of participation. 
6.1.2 Other considerations regarding the data analysis 
Another feature of our data is that the dependent variables are dichotomous variables 
(coded 0 for no participation and 1 for participation). The analysis of this type of data 
with ordinary least square (OLS) violates some conditions for the application of this 
approach, and is likely to estimate erroneous standard deviations (Rice 2001). A 
logistic regression is therefore more appropriate to model data with binary dependent 
variables. Consequently, the analysis in this chapter applies multilevel logistic 
regression models to investigate the relationship between the numerous variables in 
this model. 
However, the estimation of multilevel logistic regression models is rather complex, 
and only a few software programs can deal with it. In this analysis, we use a student 
version of HLM 5.04 to estimate the regression coefficients. Compared with other 
multilevel software, such as MLwiN, which was not available to the author at the 
time of analysis, the student version of HLM has a number of disadvantages. 
For the first, there were restrictions to the number of variables that can be included 
into the analysis on each level of analysis. Therefore, it is not possible to estimate 
more than five effects on each level; and we have to restrict the number of variables 
on each level to four (since an intercept is estimated on each level as well). Because 
of this restriction, we cannot include more than three control variables into the 
analysis. Another drawback of HLM is that it is difficult to estimate the level of 
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significance of the random effects. We can easily estimate the level of significance of 
the fixed effects using a t-test, whereas we need to calculate a more complex 
deviance test to estimate the level of significance of the random effect (Snijders & 
Bosker 1999: 220). HLM is actually supposed to estimate these kinds of deviance 
statistics rather well by a Lapace approximation. However, because the student 
version of HLM only includes a very brief manual, we do not carry out these tests in 
order to avoid calculation errors and the statement of false levels of significance. 
Consequently, the variance component of the random effect is presented without a 
p-value. 
A third disadvantage with the HLM is that it is not possible to include weights on 
the individual level of analysis. This is especially important in the context of this 
analysis because the data were collected in a way, which can make it necessary to 
apply weights on the individual level (see section 1.3). On the other hand, we can 
argue that when it is the objective of the analysis to examine causal models, as is the 
case here, every respondent should have the same weight. In this context, however, is 
it important to specify the model satisfactory, which means that we include all 
variables that are supposed to be correlated with the independent and dependent 
variables at the same time. Because of the restrictions of the software, it is not 
possible to include all variables that could be of interest here. On the other hand is it 
rather unlikely that the ignorance of weights produce a bias that might alter the results 
of the estimation completely. It is rather the case that we become a bias, which 
changes the result to some degree. Of course, we cannot be sure about this, and we 
have to accept this uncertainty, because the alternative to an estimation of the model 
with HLM would probably result in biases, as well. In this case, we would break 
other conditions of the statistical analysis. 
6.2 Strategy of analysis 
In order to test the hypotheses mentioned above, we employ a stepwise regression 
analysis. Consequently, we estimate three multilevel regression models for every 
dependent variable. The first model includes all independent variables, which is size, 
conflict, interest and the control variables (Model 1). In the second regression model, 
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we drop size from the regression analysis (Model 2), while we exclude the conflict 
variable, in addition, in the final model (Model 3). Table 6.1 summarizes the strategy 
of analysis. 
Table 6.1: The characteristics of the stepwise regression analysis in Chapter 6 
 Size Conflict Interest Control variablesa 
Model 1 X X X X 
Model 2  X X X 
Model 3   X X 
 
                                                          
a
 The control variables are: the level of education, the index of internal efficacy and the measure of external 
efficacy 
 
The most important estimates for our concern are the strength and level of 
significance of the fixed effects (for size, conflict and interest, respectively) and the 
magnitude of the variance component of the random intercept. With regard to the 
hypotheses that we are going to test by the analysis, we expect the following changes 
of the fixed and random effects when we compare our three models: 
1. In Model 1 we expect the fixed effect of size to be statistically significant and to 
have a positive direction. The fixed effects of political conflict and political 
interest, on the other hand, do not have to be statistically significant. In addition, 
we can see from Model 1 whether size is a very important factor that explains 
the differences in the likelihood of political participation between 
municipalities. When this is the case, we expect the variance component of the 
random intercept to be very close or equal to zero. The reason for this is that we 
control for the effect of size in Model 1, which means that the variance of the 
likelihood of participation between the municipalities actually can be interpreted 
as variance between municipalities of the same size. In the case, that size is the 
most important variable that accounts for the differences between the 
municipalities, the differences should disappear when size is included in the 
analysis. 
2. We expect that the size of the fixed effect of political conflict increases when 
we compare Model 2 with Model 1. The fixed effect of political conflict should 
be positive and statistically significant in Model 2 and the variance component 
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of the random intercept might not increase, or increases only slightly compared 
to Model 1. 
3. When we compare Model 3 with Model 2, we expect the fixed effect of interest 
to increase significantly. Political interest should have a statistically significant 
and positive effect on the likelihood of participation in Model 3. The variance 
component is now expected to be considerably larger as in Model 2. This 
expectation is reasonable, because we in Model 3 no longer control for the 
effect of any variable on the municipal level that could account for the 
differences between the municipalities. 
6.3 Empirical analysis 
Now it is time to confront the data with our expectations. In the following three 
sections, we estimate three models for each of our independent variable. We start 
with voting at local elections and continue thereafter with the participatory act of 
contacting local political parties, and consider, at last, the act of contacting local 
politicians. 
6.3.1 Voting at local elections 
The estimated likelihood of voting within the 64 municipalities in our sample varies 
between 0,74 and 0,97. In eleven municipalities, all respondents indicated that they 
are going to vote quite likely or definitively. Whether this variation is related to the 
size of the municipalities can we see from the estimates of the multilevel logistic 
regressions. The results of the three regression models are in Table 6.2. 
When we look at the variance component of the random intercept in Model 1 and 
Model 2, we see that these estimates are clearly larger than zero. This means that the 
differences in the likelihood of participation in local elections are still there, even 
when we consider the size and the level political conflict in a municipality. However, 
at least the level of political conflict accounts for some of the variation between the 
municipalities, since the variance component of the random effect increases 
considerably when we remove the conflict variable (Model 3 compared to Model 2). 
When we look on the estimates of the fixed effects in Model 1, our assumptions 
concerning the effect of size on the likelihood of participation are not supported. Size 
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Table 6.2: The results of the estimation of three multivariate logistic regression 
models with the likelihood of voting in local elections as the dependent variable 
(the fixed effects of the control variables are omitted) 
Model 1 
Fixed effect Coefficient p-value 
Interest 1,2758 <0,001 
Conflict -4,0098 0,082 
Size 0,1059 0,621 
 
  
Random effect Variance component 
Random 
intercept 0,1141 
 
Model 2 
Fixed effect Coefficient p-value 
Interest 1,2746 <0,001 
Conflict -3,6246 0,054 
Size – – 
 
  
Random effect Variance component 
Random 
intercept 0,1147 
 
Model 3 
Fixed effect Coefficient p-value 
Interest 1,2819 <0,001 
Conflict – – 
Size – – 
 
  
Random effect Variance component 
Random 
intercept 0,1678 
 
does not have a significant effect on the likelihood of participation. On the other 
hand, the fixed effect of conflict is significant at 10% and interest in local politics is 
significant at a 1% level of significance. The effect of conflict becomes even more 
significant when we remove size from the regression in Model 2. This indicates that 
some of the effect of size on the likelihood of participation goes via political conflict, 
which is as expected. However, the direction of the effect of political conflict is 
surprising. The likelihood of participation is higher in municipalities with a lower 
level of conflict. 
With regard to the fixed effect of the interest variable on the level of participation 
in local elections, we find a positive relationship, which is highly significant in all 
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three models. It is striking that the effect of political interest does not appear to 
chance when we control for the structural variables. Political interest seems to have 
an effect of the likelihood to vote which is independent of the size of a municipality 
and their level of conflict. In this respect, our assumptions are not supported. 
Of course, the results of this analysis are probably biased because the variable that 
measures the likelihood of participation over-estimates the actual participation 
considerably. An alternative recoding of the original variable might be reasonable. 
The answer of the original variable about the expressed probability of participation in 
future local elections in the survey were coded in four categories, ranging from 
“Definitively not” to “Definitely” (see Appendix A). For the previous analysis, we 
coded the respondents that answered “Definitively” not and “Quite likely not” as “No 
participation”, and the respondents that answered “Quite likely” or “Definitely” as 
“Participation”. Now, we recode the answers in a way that only those persons that 
answered “Definitely” were coded as “Participation”, whereas the other answers were 
coded as “No participation”. In this way, we get a better picture of the likelihood of 
participation in local elections; although the variable still over-estimates the 
likelihood of participation considerably (see section 4.2.2). After the recoding of the 
dependent variable, the likelihood of participation between the 64 municipalities 
varies between 0,6 and 0,95, and there were no municipalities were all respondents 
indicated that they will definitely participate in elections. Let us take a look on the 
estimates of the re-estimation of the three regression models with the re-coded 
variable of participation in local elections. Table 6.3 presents the results. 
The results of the re-estimation are surprising. Now, the structural variables seem 
to be not significant to explain the likelihood of participation at all. The fixed effects 
of size and the level of conflict are no longer significant at 10%. Moreover, the 
exclusion of the size variable in Model 2 does not change this picture; the effect of 
conflict becomes more significant, but not at a 10% level of significance. 
Surprisingly, the variance component of the random intercept is quite small in all 
three models, despite the fact that the structural variables are not significant. The 
variance component increases, indeed, when we remove the conflict variable from the 
analysis, but the variance component is still at a low level in Model 3 compared to the 
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Table 6.3: The results of the estimation of three multivariate logistic regression 
models with the (recoded) likelihood of voting in local elections as the dependent 
variable (the fixed effects of the control variables are omitted) 
Model 1 
Fixed effect Coefficient p-value 
Interest 0,8980 <0,001 
Conflict -2,0237 0,173 
Size 0,0116 0,917 
 
  
Random effect Variance component 
Random 
intercept 0,0208 
 
Model 2 
Fixed effect Coefficient p-value 
Interest 0,8975 <0,001 
Conflict -1,9893 0,120 
Size – – 
 
  
Random effect Variance component 
Random 
intercept 0,0204 
 
Model 3 
Fixed effect Coefficient p-value 
Interest 0,8991 <0,001 
Conflict – – 
Size – – 
 
  
Random effect Variance component 
Random 
intercept 0,0414 
 
value of our first analysis (see Table 6.2). This might indicate that there are only 
small differences between the municipalities with regard to the likelihood of 
participation in elections. Consequently, the random intercept takes always a very 
low value irrespective of the independent variables that are included in the model. 
Municipality size and political conflict seems to be not relevant to explain the 
likelihood of participation. On the other hand, is the effect of political interest very 
significant. Moreover, the effect of political interest is the same in all three models, 
which indicates again that the degree of political interest is independent of the 
structural variables that we consider in this analysis. 
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To sum up the results of the analysis, we can say that the degree of interest in local 
politics is the most important variable that explains the participation in local 
elections. In addition, we saw that the effect of political interest on the likelihood of 
voting is independent of the level of political conflict within a municipality and the 
size of the municipality. Thus, interest in local politics is not a variable that mediates 
between the level of conflict and the likelihood of voting. This is true for both version 
of the dependent variable. Both structural variables have a very weak effect on the 
likelihood of voting, but the level of conflict seems to be more relevant. However, the 
direction of the effect of the level of conflict is negative, which contradicts our 
assumptions. 
It seems therefore that the data material does not support our hypotheses with 
regard to the effect of structural variables on the likelihood to participate in local 
elections. It is only the assumption that persons that are more interested in politics are 
more likely to vote in local elections, which is supported by the analysis.  
6.3.2 Contacting local parties 
With regard to our next dependent variable, contacting local parties, the estimated 
likelihoods of participation vary between 0,03 and 0,38 in our 64 municipalities. In 
five municipalities, no respondent indicated to have contacted a party at all. Table 6.4 
presents the results of the estimation of the three multilevel logistic regression 
models. 
In Model 1, we see that the variance component of the random intercept is almost 
zero. However, when we exclude the size variable (in Model 2), the variance 
component increases strongly, and is constant even when we exclude the conflict 
variable (in Model 3). This strongly indicates that size explains the variation between 
the municipalities with regard to the likelihood of contacting parties well. This 
interpretation is also supported by the fact that size has a highly significant effect in 
Model 1. However, the negative direction of the effect of size is surprising. Residents 
in smaller municipalities are more likely to contact parties than residents in larger 
municipalities are. This is the opposite of what we expected. 
The effect of political conflict is not significant in Model 1, and does even become 
less significant when size is removed from the regression model. With regard to 
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Table 6.4: The results of the estimation of three multivariate logistic 
regression models with the likelihood of contacting a local party as the 
dependent variable (the fixed effects of the control variables are omitted) 
Model 1 
Fixed effect Coefficient p-value 
Interest 1,1623 <0,001 
Conflict 3,4148 0,109 
Size -0,8143 0,001 
 
  
Random effect Variance component 
Random 
intercept 0,0001 
 
Model 2 
Fixed effect Coefficient p-value 
Interest 1,1863 <0,001 
Conflict 0,6048 0,771 
Size – – 
 
  
Random effect Variance component 
Random 
intercept 0,2074 
 
Model 3 
Fixed effect Coefficient p-value 
Interest 1,1868 <0,001 
Conflict – – 
Size – – 
 
  
Random effect Variance component 
Random 
intercept 0,2093 
 
interest in local politics, we find a similar pattern as in the previous analysis with 
voting as the dependent variable. Interest has a positive effect on the likelihood of 
contacting parties, and this effect is highly significant in all three models. This 
indicates again that interest has an effect on the likelihood of participation that is 
independent of the structural variables. 
In the case of contacting local parties as the dependent variable, we see that our 
assumptions find only limited support. Again, interest in local politics is among the 
variables that explain the likelihood of contacting significantly. Even the direction of 
the effect of interest is as expected – positive. However, it does not seem that interest 
is related to the structural variables; interest seems to have an independent effect on 
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Table 6.5: The results of the estimation of three multivariate logistic 
regression models with the likelihood of contacting a local politician as the 
dependent variable (the fixed effects of the control variables are omitted) 
Model 1 
Fixed effect Coefficient p-value 
Interest 0,7363 <0,001 
Conflict 1,4811 0,123 
Size -1,0700 <0,001 
 
  
Random effect Variance component 
Random 
intercept –
a
 
 
Model 2 
Fixed effect Coefficient p-value 
Interest 0,7495 <0,001 
Conflict -2,0060 0,109 
Size – – 
 
  
Random effect Variance component 
Random 
intercept 0,2060 
 
Model 3 
Fixed effect Coefficient p-value 
Interest 0,7461 <0,001 
Conflict – – 
Size – – 
 
  
Random effect Variance component 
Random 
intercept 0,2278 
 
                                                          
a
 The random intercept was not possible to estimate for Model 1. This is probably because the random effect 
was not significantly different from zero 
 
the dependent variable. With regard to the structural variables, we find that conflict is 
not a significant explanation variable. Size, on the other hand, has a significant effect, 
and accounts for the variation between the municipalities to a large degree. The effect 
of size on contacting local parties is, however, negative. 
6.3.3 Contacting local politicians 
Finally, we consider the participatory act of contacting local politicians as dependent 
variable. The likelihood of contacting politicians varies between 0,04 and 0,5 in the 
64 municipalities in our data material. In no municipality, all respondents indicate 
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that they have not contacted a local politician. Table 6.5 presents the results of our 
multilevel analysis. 
The pattern in Table 6.5 is almost identical to the results in Table 6.4, where we 
analyzed contacting local parties as dependent variable. Again, size has a highly 
significant effect on the likelihood of contacting politicians, which is negative. It 
appears at the same time that size accounts for the variation of the likelihood between 
the 64 municipalities. The effect of conflict is not significant in Model 1 and Model 
2. At last, interest in local politics seems to have a highly significant and positive 
effect on the likelihood of contacting local politicians. This effect appears again to be 
independent of the structural variables. 
6.4 Summary: the relationship between size and participation 
It seems that the empirical material does not support our third hypothesis. The 
analysis in this chapter gives no indication of a positive relation between the level of 
conflict, the degree of political interest and the likelihood of participation. Instead of 
a causal relationship between these three variables, we find that the degree of political 
interest has a positive effect on all three forms of participation; and this effect is 
independent of the level of conflict. Moreover, does the level of conflict only affect 
the likelihood of participation for one political act, voting in local elections. The 
direction of this effect, however, is negative and therefore the opposite of what we 
had expected. Furthermore, when we recode the variable that measures participation 
in local elections, the effect of political conflict becomes insignificant. 
Our assumptions with regard to size are not supported as well. With regard to 
voting in local elections, size does not have an effect on the likelihood of 
participation at all. On the other hand, size matters in the case of contacting 
politicians and contacting parties. However, the direction of the relationship is 
negative, and not positive as initially expected. In addition, size affects the likelihood 
of participation independent of the level of political conflict and the interest variable. 
With regard to the overall pattern of the relationship between size and our three forms 
of participation, we achieve very similar results as those of Bjørklund & Sørensen 
(1990) and Rose (2002a), which we presented in the introductory chapter. 
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7. Conclusion 
Let us recapitulate the main findings of this work. In the introductory chapter, we 
asked whether size is related to the likelihood of participation. The answer to this 
question seems to depend on which form of participation we concentrate. The 
likelihood of participation in local elections does not appear to be related to 
municipality size; moreover, the likelihood of voting appears to vary only slightly 
between the municipalities. On the other hand, we find similar patterns of 
relationships between size and our two forms of contacting. The likelihood of 
contacting local parties and local politicians decreases with increasing municipality 
size; it is more likely that a resident in a smaller municipality takes contact with a 
party or a politician than a resident in a larger municipality. Consequently, there is 
evidence that municipality size has to be taken into consideration when the level of 
participation is analyzed. However, the direction of the relationship is not as 
expected. In the introductory chapter, we presented a set of three hypotheses that in 
sum predict that municipality size is positively related to the likelihood of 
participation. This prediction is not supported by our analysis, and the crucial 
question is which hypothesis among our set of three hypotheses cannot be validated. 
With regard to our first hypothesis – the assumption that larger municipalities are 
more diverse than smaller municipalities – we could not draw any clear conclusion. 
The pattern of the relationship between size and diversity is mixed. Some measures of 
diversity were positively related to the size of a municipality, others were negatively 
related, and one measure of diversity is even curvilinear related to the size of a 
municipality. 
The second hypothesis claims that larger and more diverse municipalities are 
characterized by a higher level of political conflict than smaller municipalities and 
municipalities that are less diverse. The data material supports the assumptions 
concerning the effect of size on the level of conflict. Size has a strong and positive 
effect on the level of conflict. However, there is some evidence that the relationship 
between size and political conflict is curvilinear, with an underlying positive 
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relationship. This means that the level of conflict is highest in the municipalities of 
medium size, whereas the level of conflict is lower at the ends of the size scale. Still, 
the level of conflict appears to be lower in the smallest municipalities as compared to 
the largest municipalities. With regard to diversity, our data material does not support 
the second hypothesis strongly. The explanatory power of the measures of diversity is 
rather restricted and the direction of their effects is ambiguous. 
We can therefore conclude that the measures of diversity are not related to a 
municipality’s size and its level of conflict in the way as we expected. There seems to 
be no clear pattern of relationship between these three variables, and it is difficult to 
find an alternative explanation for the relationship between these three variables. 
Therefore, we excluded the measures of diversity from the further analysis. However, 
this does not mean that our assumption of a positive relationship between size and 
participation is not supported by the data. The empirical evidence weakens the 
assumption that size has an indirect, positive effect on the level of political conflict 
via diversity, but we have still evidence for a positive and curvilinear effect between 
size and the level of conflict. This would imply that the level of participation is 
highest in municipalities of medium size. 
However, our third hypothesis does not get support from our empirical material. 
Political conflict appears to be unrelated to the level of political interest of the 
residents within a municipality and to the likelihood of participation of these 
residents. This is true for all forms of participation, with the exception of the first 
version of participating in local elections. However, in this case, the direction of the 
effect of political conflict is negative. Since the effect of political conflict becomes 
insignificant when we recode our election variable, it seems likely that the significant 
effect of political conflict is only a result of the biased measurement of participation 
in local elections. On the other hand, is the degree of political interest of the residents 
a very significant predictor of participation. This is true for all forms of participation 
that we consider in this analysis. However, the effect of the interest variable on the 
likelihood of participation is independent of municipality size or the level of conflict 
within a municipality. Figure 7.1 summarizes the findings of our analysis, and 
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Figure 7.1: Graphical review of the results of the analysis in this work 
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compares these findings to our initial assumptions that we presented in the 
introductory chapter. 
Therefore, it appears that our third hypothesis is the weakest link in our causal 
chain; political conflict does not mobilize the residents in a municipality to engage in 
the three forms of participation that we studied here. The likelihood of participation is 
independent of the level of political conflict, and we have to find alternative 
mechanisms that explain the relationship between municipality size and the 
likelihood to contact local parties and politicians. 
However, before we discuss the consequences of the results of this analysis for the 
relationship between size and participation, we discuss briefly, to which degree our 
methodological approach can have affected the results of the analysis. 
7.1 Methodological interpretation 
Two features are of special importance when we consider the effect of our 
methodological approach on the result of the analysis: the conceptualization of some 
of the most important variables and the features of the data analysis that we carried 
out. 
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7.1.1 Conceptualization of variables 
In this context, we mentioned already the problems that were related to the 
measurement of a municipality’s diversity and its level of political conflict. With 
regard to the measurement of diversity, we measured only one out of three aspects of 
the group structure within a municipality that we considered as important. We 
measured the relative size of subgroups along a cleavage line, while we assumed that 
the number of cleavage lines within a municipality and the number of subgroups 
along these cleavage lines are constant throughout all municipalities. Further, we 
defined the number and the nature of the politically relevant (or manifest) cleavage 
lines theoretically and not empirically. This opens, of course, for the possibility that 
we considered cleavage lines as politically relevant, which in reality only are 
potential cleavage lines. By theoretical reasoning, we can only identify divisions of 
the population, which has some probability for conflict; and as we pointed out in the 
introductory chapter, does a cleavage line not always have to result in conflict among 
these subgroups of the population (see section 1.2.2). This might be the reason for the 
low explanatory power of our measures of diversity. 
A solution for this problem is not possible with the data material that we used in 
this work. For a detailed analysis of the cleavage structure in Norwegian 
municipalities, we need a larger sample of residents in each municipality. 
Theoretically, it should then be possible to measure the individuals’ “subjective 
self-interest”, and to relate this measure of self-interest to the residents’ social 
background variables. The results of such an analysis can be the starting point of a 
new version of an analysis of the relationship between diversity and party 
competition. 
The measurement of political conflict is ambiguous as well. Earlier we argued that 
the relationship between political conflict and political interest is the 
“micro-macro-link” in this analysis. We assume that the level of political conflict in a 
municipality affects the degree of interest in local politics, and that this, in turn, 
affects the likelihood of participation. However, we were not very satisfied with the 
empirical modelling of “this micro-macro-link” in our analysis. We measured 
political conflict on the municipal level of analysis, and the level of interest on the 
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individual level of analysis. This opens for speculations about how the residents in a 
municipality actually perceive the level of conflict within a municipality. As we 
mentioned, does a high level of political conflict, measured on the municipal level of 
analysis, not automatically imply that the residents in a municipality perceive the 
level of conflict as being high. In this way, it is unclear how to interpret the finding of 
no relationship between the level of political conflict in a municipality and the degree 
of political interest among the residents in this municipality. One possible 
interpretation can be that a high level of conflict does not increase the residents’ 
interest in politics. Another possible interpretation could be that there is no direct 
connection between the level of political conflict, measured as party competition on 
the municipal level of analysis, and the individual perception of the level of political 
conflict by the residents. 
With our data material, we cannot determine which one of these two 
interpretations is correct. A possible solution for this problem can be the 
measurement of the residents’ perceived level of political conflict on the individual 
level. This individual measure can then be related to structural measures of conflict, 
and hopefully we will be able to detect a pattern of relationship between the structural 
and individual measures of conflict. 
Finally, the measurement of participation in politics is problematic as well. In 
Chapter 4, we have already discussed the problems that are connected to the 
measurements of participation in local elections and contacting local political parties 
and politicians, and it is clear that the measurement bias can have an effect for the 
result of our analysis. Although there is reason to believe that there is a measurement 
bias for all three forms of participation, it is reasonable that the bias is strongest for 
participation in local elections. As a citizen in a municipality, the respondents might 
feel some kind of obligation to participate in local elections. Furthermore, the 
participation in local elections might be socially expected, and the residents feel 
pressured to cast a vote. In an interview situation, the respondents will therefore not 
admit that they do not participate in local elections. This argumentation is, however, 
not valid for the other forms of participation. It is not reasonable to assume that it is 
socially expected to contact local politicians or a local political party; here are 
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problems with regard to recall and the sampling bias more important. Therefore, the 
variable that measures the participation in local elections has probably the strongest 
bias of our three participation variables. 
When we compare the measured frequency of participation in local elections with 
the actual turnout (see section 4.2.2), we see that the measurement bias is enormous. 
The magnitude of the measurement bias is otherwise of about the same size for the 
two alternative measurements of participation in local elections in the “Size and local 
democracy in Norway”-survey. It is therefore possible that the measurement bias of 
participation in local elections conceals real differences between the municipalities 
with regard to the likelihood of participation. This is a reasonable assumption because 
there is actually some evidence that the turnout in local elections is related to the size 
of a municipality. Bjørklund & Saglie (2000: 57) point out that the relationship 
between turnout rate and municipality size has changes in the past. Up to 1971, there 
was a positive relationship between size and the turnout rate; the turnout was higher 
in larger municipalities. However, this relationship altered in the period since 1971. 
The participation in local elections is now higher in smaller municipalities than in 
larger ones, and the local elections in 1999 strengthened the contrast between the 
smallest and the largest municipalities. However, it is difficult to point on a good 
solution for the measurement bias of the participation variables. 
7.1.2 Data analysis 
Although we applied rather sophisticated statistical methods, we could not account 
for all features of the data material in our analysis, in order to calculate unbiased 
estimators. In this context, the ignorance of the different sampling probabilities of the 
residents within different municipalities affects the result of the analysis. This 
problem can be avoided by the application of a weighted analysis, where the 
individual respondents attain weights according to their sampling probability. 
However, our statistical software did not allow the use of weights on the individual 
level. 
Another problem with our data analysis is that we cannot ascertain the direction of 
the causal effect. This is especially relevant in the case of the relationship between a 
resident’s degree of political interest and a resident’s likelihood of participation. The 
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finding of a highly significant relationship between these two variables can therefore 
be interpreted in two ways: first, we might conclude that those people that are more 
interested in politics are also more likely to participate; the political attitude comes 
causally before the act of participation. But we might also conclude that participation 
comes causally before the political attitude; when a person participates in politics, she 
becomes more interested in politics. With our data, it is not possible to determine the 
direction of the causal effect. For this objective, we need a special kind of data, where 
the same respondents were asked several times about their political attitudes and their 
likelihood of participation, at different points in time. 
To sum up the methodological interpretation, we can say that we have to be careful 
with the interpretations of the results of this analysis. The measurement and analysis 
of the analytical model is based on a number of presuppositions and simplifications, 
which can affect the result of the analysis. Unfortunately, it is not possible to say to 
which degree the results of this analysis were biased, and whether the levels of 
significance were over or under estimated. However, these presuppositions and 
simplifications were necessary in order to be able to carry out a test of our analytical 
model with the data available. Therefore, we should be careful when drawing 
conclusions, and consider this work only as a small part in a larger scientific process 
where other scientists approach the same problem with a different method and 
different data. Over time, we can see whether the results from different analysis are 
consistent, or not. 
7.2 Substantial interpretation 
At last, there is the possibility that the results of the analysis give a correct description 
of the situation in Norway. What does this mean for the relationship between size and 
democracy? 
In the beginning, when we considered the general relationship between size and 
participation, we asked whether there is an ideal size of a municipality with regard to 
democracy. Based on this analysis, we can say that the likelihood of participation in 
the three forms of participation considered here is maximized in the smallest 
municipalities. However, the participation in these three forms of political activity is 
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only a small part of the democratic system in a municipality. We have certainly also 
to consider other forms of participation, such as the participation in political actions 
or the participation in political and non-political organizations. In addition, it is 
important to consider other aspects of democracy as well. For instance, is it 
interesting to investigate the relationship between municipality size and the 
responsiveness of the system; are local politicians in smaller municipalities more 
responsive to the residents’ opinion than politicians in larger municipalities are? 
Another interesting question relates to Dahl & Tufte’s concept of system capacity. Is 
it really the case that the participation in small municipalities is trivial, because small 
municipalities have not the possibility to implement their own policies without the 
interference of other actors? Only when we consider all democratic aspects together, 
we can draw a conclusion with regard to the ideal size of a municipality. 
With regard to our assumptions concerning the mechanisms that tie municipality 
size and participation together, our analytical model did not get support from the 
empirical material. It is mainly the assumption that political conflict mobilizes 
residents to participate in politics that is not supported. The question is therefore 
which alternative connections between size and participation can be relevant to 
consider? 
With regard to the participation in local elections, Hansen et al. (2002) might have 
an answer. In their article, they attempted to test three possible explanatory models of 
participation in local elections. The model that had the strongest explanatory power 
was a communitarian model. The line of thinking behind this model is that the 
residents within a municipality participate in elections because of altruistic motives. 
The interests of the community are considered as more important than the 
individuals’ self-interest, and the reason for the participation in local elections is 
therefore that the individual residents have a sense of obligation towards the 
community. It is most likely that we will find this type of understanding of society in 
local communities that are characterized by close and trustful relationships between 
the residents (Hansen et al. 2002: 52).  
However, it is important to point out that Hansen and his colleagues only focused 
on characteristics of the municipalities as explanation factors; they carried out their 
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analysis on the municipal level. Therefore, the results of their analysis are 
relationships between variables on the municipal level, and cannot be used to draw 
conclusions about the individual residents’ motivation to participate in elections. 
However, their analysis gives an indication about which explanations should be 
considered in future analysis. Therefore, it might be fruitful, to complement an 
explanatory model of political participation in local elections with aspects of a 
communitarian model. 
In this context, it would be interesting to investigate whether the conception of 
individuals as rational actors is a good model of reality. Perhaps another individual 
decision theory is more fruitful for the research around size and democracy. When it 
is the case that the residents in a municipality participate in local elections because 
they are closely integrated into a local community and feel an obligation towards 
community values, we could apply some kind of role theory as the individual 
decision theory. The main thought behind the role theory is that an individual acts on 
the background of expectations from groups that are close and important to the 
individual. The groups can apply positive and negative sanctions in order to 
encourage desired actions or to deter undesired actions of the individual (AG 
Soziologie 1993). In this way, the research focus will be no longer on the individual 
calculations with regard to the costs and benefits of an action, but on the social 
networks, that surrounds an individual, and the expectations of these social networks. 
Furthermore, communitarian arguments are not necessarily restricted to explain 
participation in local elections alone; this line of thinking can be relevant for other 
forms of participation as well. However, for contacting local political parties or 
politicians, another potential explanation can link municipality size to the level of 
participation. We have already outlined in Chapter 3 that smaller municipalities have 
more representatives in the municipal council (relatively spoken) than larger 
municipalities have. Therefore, it is more likely that residents in smaller 
municipalities know local politicians personally, and that more residents (relatively 
spoken) have experience as representative in the municipal council. These features 
affect undoubtedly the likelihood of contacting politicians or parties. To know a 
politician personally makes it easier to contact the politician on a political issue. 
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Moreover, to have experience as a representative makes it easier to take contact with 
a politician or a party. It becomes also more likely that organizations recruit the 
person with experience as a local politician. In this way, the person with experience 
as a local politician can promote the interests of the organization, and contact a 
politician or a party on behalf of organizations. 
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Appendix A: Wording and coding of variables 
Dependent variables 
Voting.     “Suppose elections for the municipal council were to be held tomorrow, 
how likely is it that you would cast a vote?” The responses were registered on a four 
point scale (1 = Definitely, 2 = Quite likely, 3 = Quite likely not, 4 = Definitely not), 
and were dichotomized by coding the first two answers into a Yes (= 1) category and 
the latter two answers into a No (=0) category. The alternative classification (applied 
in Chapter 6) classifies only the respondents that were definitely sure about their 
participation into the Yes (=1) category. The respondents that answered one of the 
three other categories were coded as No (=0). 
 
Contacting local parties.     “Have you done any of the following activities in the 
last two years in an attempt to influence municipal authorities? … Contacted a party 
in the municipality?” (0 = No, 1 = Yes). 
 
Contacting local politicians.     “Have you done any of the following activities in the 
last two years in an attempt to influence municipal authorities? …Contacted a 
representative of the municipal council?” (0 = No, 1 = Yes). 
Independent variables 
Municipality size.     Conceptualized as the logarithm at the base of 10 of 
municipality size; continuous variable 
 
Conflict level.     Conceptualized as the fractionalization index; continuous variable 
 
Interest in municipal politics.     “Sometimes the interest in politics of people varies 
according to different types of politics. How interested are you for instance in 
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municipal politics?” (0 = Not at all interested, 1 = Not very interested, 2 = Fairly 
interested, 3 = Very interested). 
Control variables. 
Education.     Registry data. The highest formal education was coded into 4 
categories: 0 = schooling not completed/Primary school, 1 = Lower secondary school, 
2 = Upper secondary school, 3 = College or university/Postgraduate. 
 
External efficacy.     “To which degree do you mean that the mayor and the 
representatives in the municipal council usually pay attention to the opinions of the 
residents when they make decisions?” The answer categories were: not at all, very 
little, somewhat, quite a bit, and very much. The responses were recoded for the 
analysis, in a way that a strong believe in the responsiveness of the politicians 
indicated a high level of external efficacy. Five categories were created: 0 = Low 
level of external efficacy, … , 4 = High level of external efficacy. 
 
Internal efficacy index.     The degree of internal efficacy was measured as an 
additive index of the answers on the following two questions. The respondents were 
asked to indicate whether they agree strongly, agree somewhat, neither nor, disagree 
somewhat, disagree strongly with the following statements: 
a. I consider myself as being well qualified to participate in local politics. 
b. I have a fairly good understanding of the most important issues which my 
municipality faces 
We summarized and recoded the answers on these questions in a way that a high 
agreement on these statements indicates a high level of internal efficacy. The five 
categories used in the analysis were: 0 = Low level of internal efficacy, … , 4 = High 
level of internal efficacy. 
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Appendix B: Calculation of conflict variables 
The measure that compares the relative size of the parties in the municipal council is 
calculated by the formula 
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where k is the number of parties represented in the municipal council and pi is the 
share of representatives that party i has in the municipal council. The formula in 
parentheses in the numerator calculates the effective number of parties, which varies 
between 1 and the actual number of parties k. By subtracting 1 the numerator varies 
between 0 and (k-1). The division of this expression by (k-1) standardizes the 
measure irrespective of the number of parties in the municipal council. 
The index of fractionalization (Rae 1971: 56) estimates the probability that two 
voters elect two different parties at a local election and is calculated by the formula 
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Table B.1 presents the value of the index of fractionalization in thirteen imaginable 
political systems. 
Table B.1: Values of the index of fractionalization in thirteen different systems 
Share of representatives of party pi in municipal council System F-value P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 
A 0,0 1,0        
B 0,18 0,9 0,1       
C 0,32 0,8 0,2       
D 0,48 0,6 0,4       
E 0,5 0,5 0,5       
F 0,58 0,5 0,4 0,1      
G 0,62 0,5 0,3 0,2      
H 0,64 0,4 0,4 0,2      
I 0,67 0,33 0,33 0,33      
J 0,70 0,4 0,3 0,2 0,1     
K 0,75 0,25 0,25 0,25 0,25     
L 0,80 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2    
M 0,875 0,125 0,125 0,125 0,125 0,125 0,125 0,125 0,125 
Source: Rae 1971: 57; Table 3.1 
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Appendix C: Results of the regression analysis 
Dependent variable is the measure that compares the relative size of the parties that 
are represented in the municipal council: 
Table C.1: Results of the estimation of three regression models with the 
measurement that compares the relative sizes of the parties within the municipal 
council as the dependent variable 
 Mod. 1 Mod. 2 Mod. 3 
Municipality size -0,292* -0,358* 
(Municipality size)2 -0,062 – -0,050 
Class diversity 0,112 0,048 
Religious diversity 0,050 0,061 
Demographic diversity -0,165** -0,174** 
Family diversity 1: 
Number of parents -0,305
*
 -0,269* 
Family diversity 2: 
Children living at home -0,002 -0,067 
Income diversity 
– 
-0,133 0,096 
Explained variance – R2 0,101 0,139 0,199 
 *…significant at 1%;  **…significant at 5%;  ***…significant at 10% 
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